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Preface 
I extend grateful thanks to Dr. George Merrill for 
his advice and guidance, not only in the preparation of this 
thesis but in the course work that preceded it. lowe thanks 
in equal measure to my wife, whose fortitude and forbearance 
in difficult circumstances provided me with the time required 
to complete the work. 
In quoting from The Faerie Queene, I have adopted 
the usual method of identifying lines by book, canto, and 
stanza number only. Thus, for example, the notation (V, xi, 32) 
directs the reader to Book V, Canto 11, Stanza 32. 
D. F. 
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Abstract of Thesis 
This thesis surveys the action and structure of 
Spenser's The Faerie Queene from the perspective of the ideal 
of justice. Its basic assumption is that fundamentally the 
poem is an account of the quest for justice, in three aspects 
the psychological, the social, and the cosmological. 
Chapter One is concerned with the relation between 
the archetype of the chivalric quest and the juridical 
procedure of Roman courts of law, whose chief investigative 
officers were known as guaesitores -- "questersll. It is an 
attempt to show that the quest motif is analogous to both the 
public court of inquiry and the systematic deliberations of 
an individual mind. It is this analogy which permits Spenser 
to use the public quest as an allegory of the private quest. 
Chapter Two is a study of Book I of The Faerie Queene, 
in which references to the philosophical system of Plot"inus 
are used to explicate Spenserls use of the concepts of lIunity" 
and IIholiness". The contention of this chapter is that Book I 
lays the conceptual foundations for later books by dealing 
with the theme of justice first in its theological aspect -­
i.e. the questton of religious justification. 
;i 
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Chapter Three is an attempt to interpret the quest 
of Guyon in Book II as the search for and the attainment of 
psychological harmony within the i'ndividual. The concept of 
Temperance is considered in the light of classica1 ethical 
theory, most particularly in terms of the traditional 
distinction between pathos and ethos. 
Chapter Four considers Books III and IV together, 
since these two books are related by virtue of their common 
action and the continuity of their characters. The theme of 
Books III and IV is the potential suffering and corruption 
with whlch erotic impulse threatens human nature. The attainment 
of chaste love by Britomart is seen as the basis for friendship 
among individuals, and therefore as the foundation of civility_ 
Chapter Five deals with Spenser1s concept of justice 
at the level of society. Its argument is that in this book 
Spenser is cO,ncerned to unite the virtues of j usti'ce and mercy, 
and for this purpose makes use of the motif of marriage 
between Artega11 and Br; tomart. It; s noted, however, that 
there is a developing irony created by the di fficul ty of 
reconcl1ing the two virtues. 
Chapter Six studies Book VI in the light of the 
deepening ironic tone of the poem, which is caused by the 
greater ambiguities of Calidore1s quest to slay the Blatant 
Beast. It is pointed out that, though Calidore lacks the 
iv 
single-minded purpose of earlier champions, he is in some 

degree more humane. The presence of Spenser1s alter ego, 

IICO 1in Cl out", sugges ts a r; ft between the ch i va 1ri c ; dea 1 

and the simpler virtues as symbolized by the pastoral setting. 

Chapter Seven reviews the structure of Books I to 
VI, and argues that the ironic tone of later books ;s central 
to Spenser1s conception of the poem, in that it presents 
alternate perspectives on justice and thus complements the 
narrowness of earlier concepts, even as it represents a 
decline in intensity and moral fervour. Spenser's intention 
is said to have been to present a fully-rounded, three­
dimensional account of human moral activity. 
Chapter Eight attempts to relate the Mutabilitie 
Cantos to the rest of the poem. It assumes that they are the 
allegorical centre of what would have become Book VII. The 
claim of Mutability to sovereignty is seen as a direct statement 
of what has already been presented in the structure of Books 
I to VI ~- the apparent truth that no human achievement is 
immune from change. Nature's judgement on Mutability's claim 
the presentation of the theme of justice at the cosmological 
level -- expresses the view that change is not structureless, 
but is in reality a IIdilation of beingll or form of cyclical 
growth. On these grounds, it is argued that "Book VIlli was 
intended by Spenser as the crisis of his total structure, 
v 
which, had he completed the poem, would have begun the movement 
of Books VII to XII back towards the supernatural haffilonies 
of Book I. 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Quest Motif 
Edmund Spenser's prefatory C0Tm11ents on The Faerie 
Queene in his letter to Raleigh are centred upon two major 
topics: his general purpose in writing the poem, and the 
narrative method he has adopted in constructing it. His 
general intention, he says, is to "fashion a gentleman or 
noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline. 1I 1 His 
narrative method is that of the "Poet historical" as contrasted 
with that of the historiographer. 
For an historiographer discourseth of affayres orderly 
as they were donne, accounting as well the times as 
the actions; but a Poet thrusteth into the middest, 
even where it most concerneth him, and there recoursing 
to the thi nges forepaste, and di vi ni ng of th"j nges to 
come, maketh a pleasing Analysis of all. 2 
His purpose in the letter is to direct attention to 
the wel-head of the History: that from thence gathering 
the whole intention of the conceij' ye may as in a 
handful' gripe al the discourse. 
The "we l-head of the Hi story"; its narrati ve source 
and orig'in, is the "Annual feaste ll kept by Gloriana; during 
whi ch time each of the kni ghtly adventures whi ch are the 
narrative basis of the poem is imagined to have begun. Astriking 
1 Quotations from Spenser are cited from The Faerie 
Queene, (Everyman Edition), J. M. Dent and Sons, London, 1910. 
The 1etter to Ra 1ei gh ci ted is"A Le tter of the Authors 
To Sir Walter Raleigh, Knight", printed in this edition on 
pp. 1-4. 
2 "Letter to Raleigh", .Q£... cit., p.3. 
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feature of his basic conception is that the occasion of the 
adventure in each case is a "complaint" made to the court of 
the Faerie Queene by the victim of an injustice. Una's parents 
have been by an huge dragon many years shut up in a brasen II 
Castle. 1I The Palmer makes his complaint on behalf of the infant 
IIwith bloody hands whose parents ••• have been slayne by 
an Enchaunteresse called Acrasia. 1I The Groom who comes next 
complains that II a vile Enchaunter, called Busirane, had in 
hand a most faire Lady, called Amoretta, whom he kept in 
most grievous torment, because she would not yield him the 
pleasure of her body.1I The letter does not contain any 
account of the occasion of the adventures described in later 
books, but it seems clear that they too are conceived to have 
begun in a similar way -- in response to the appeal for justice. 
It is apparent from Spenser1s description of the 
origin of each adventure that in its most basic and fundamental 
aspect, the action of the poem is to be conceived as aiming 
primarily at justice. The "courtll of Gloriana is both a ci rcle 
of nobles and something analogous to a court of law, to which 
plaintiffs can appeal for the redress of wrongs. In each case, 
the plaintiff is assigned a knightly champion, who undertakes 
the adventure of rescuing the victim and bringing the wrongdoer 
to justice. 
The generic term for such an adventure is "questll. 
But this term derives from the technical term for a judicial 
hearing or inquiry used in the courts of the Romans. In Roman 
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jurisprudence, the issue to be decided in such an inquiry was 
ca11ed the guaestio, and the chief investigative and prosecuting 
officers were known as guaesitores ("investigators, seekersll), 
later shortened to guaestores. The chivalric type of quest 
which is central to the action of The Faerie Queene is thus 
a romanticized version of a judicial inquiry, where the IIcasel! 
is tried, not by forensic debate, but by the ordeal of battle. 
Nevertheless, the prime function of Gloriana and her knights 
is the same as that of the Roman guaestor to investigate 
crime and bring the criminal to justice. 
The formal proceedings of the Roman court of law 
display a basic structure of juridical inquiry that is still 
to be observed in the proceedings of modern courts. In Roman 
law, the case was begun by the act of postulatio, a naming 
of the criminal with a statement of the case against him, 
which was, in effect, a "request" for permission to prosecute. 
If the postulatio were granted, there followed the interrogatio, 
the questioning of the accused by the praetor. This was followed 
by the actiones, the speeches by accuser and defendant. The 
trial concluded with the probatio, the IIproving" of the case, 
in which documents, circumstantial evidence, and declarations 
of witnesses were used. After the probatio, the praetores 
pronounced judgement by means of secret ballot on wax tablets, 
inscribed with an "A" (absolvo, I acquit), or a "C" (condemno, 
I condemn) 4. 
4 See the article, IIJudicial Procedure, Roman", in 
Oskar Seyffert, A Dictionary of Classical Antiguities, revised 
and edited by Henry Nettleship and J. E. Sandys, Meridian Books, 
New York, 1957, pp. 333~336. 
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Not only this procedure, but much of its terminology, 
survives in the modern judicial process. We still speak of 
the "interrogation" of witnesses, of lIactions at law", and 
of "probat"ing" wills. It is also worth noting, however, that 
much of this vocabulary has been adopted in reference not to 
public courts of law but to the proceedings of the individual 
mind in its pri vate de 1iberati ons .... - the "sessi ons of sweet 
silent thought", as Shakespeare called them. We still use the 
term IIpostul ate 1/, for example, to refer to a theory or an 
assumption that is yet to be proven, and the terms "inquiry", 
II; nterrogati on II, and "proof!! in an analogous way, wi th 
reference to a systematic investigation carried on by a 
single mind. The parallel between Roman juridical inquiry 
and the rhetorical forms of medieval scholasticism will be 
apparent to any reader of St. Thomas Aquinas. Uniformly~ St. 
Thomas' discussions of philosophical IIquestionsll begin with 
a statement describing the IIpostulatefl that he intends to 
deal with -- for example, "Whether Providence can suitably 
be attributed to God?" (Summa Theologica, Question XXII). 5 
This is always followed by a statement of what appears to be 
the case: lilt seems that providence is not becoming to God. 1I 
This apparent truth is supported by what is, in effect, an 
interrogatio of other writers on the question -- in this case, 
Cicero, Aristotle, and St. John Damascene. But there always 
5 The Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aguinas, edited 




follows a reversal or peripeteia , marked by the words lion the 
contraryll . 
On the contrary, it is said (Wis. XIV, 3) : But thou, 
Father, govern all things by providence. 6 
St. Thomas then proceeds to his counter-argument, marked by 
the words, "I answer that ... ", which is followed by a 
systemati c rebuttal of the wri ters quoted in the openi ng 
section. Thus does the medieval philosopher proceed, in the 
privacy of his own thoughts, or in the seclusion of the 
schoolroom, through a systematic IIcourt of inquiry" in which 
he himself acts as IJpostulant" ~ accuser, defence counsel, and 
jury. 
The close relation between Roman jurisprudence and 
philosophi'cal method is apparent, however, not only in this 
metaphoric identification of the mind with a court of law. 
Alfred North Whitehead has remarked that not only the method 
of modern science but its content has been profoundly 
influenced by the Roman legal tradition. 
In spite of the actual anarchy throughout large 
regions of Europe after the collapse of the 
empire, the sense of legal order always haunted 
the racial memories of the Imperial populations 
It is important to notice that this legal

impress upon medieval civilization was not in 

the form of a few wise precepts which should 

permeate conduct. It was the conception of a 






legality of the detgiled structure of social 

organism, and of the detailed way 1'n which it 

should function. There was nothing vague. It 

was not a question of admirable maxims, but of 

definite procedure to put things right and to 

keep them there. 7 

It is this conception of a "definite articulated system" which 
Western scientific thought shares with the Roman legal tradition: 
the assumption or the instinctive faith that particular phenomena, 
whether of nature or of human behavi our, are not di screte, 
anomalous, and absurd, but instances of genera1 principles and 
laws. In the words of Ernst Cassirer, 
Essentially cognition is always oriented towards 

this essential aim, the articulation of the 8 

particular into a universal law and order. 

The intimacy of re1ation between juridical and 
scientific Jllaw" is further revealed in ItmJanuel Kant's 
ins-istence that· the investigator must approach nature not in 
the role of pupil but in the role of quaestor or judge. 
Reason, holding in one hand its principles,

according to which alone concordant appearances 

can be admitted as equivalent to laws, and in 

the other the experiment which it has devised 

in conformity with these principles, must 

approach nature in order to be taught by it. It 

must not, however, do so in the character of a 

pupil who listens to everything that the teacher 

has to say, but of an appointed judge who compels 

the witness to answer questions which he has 

h"imself formulated. 9 

7 Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 
The MacMi 11 an Company, 1925, p. 11" - ­
8 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosoph~ of Symbolic Forms, 
translated by Ralph Manheim, Yale University Press, New Haven, 
Vol ~ 1, p. 77. 
9- Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, 
translated by Norman Kemp. Smith, MacMillan and Company, London, 
1952, p. 14. 
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The concept of physical or scientific Illaw", in other words, is 
much more than a mere analogy; it reflects an abiding sense 
that nature ;s a community, and that human society ;s a 
rational order within that community, that man, society, and 
nature are uniformly ruled by a system of principles capable 
of rationalizing all of experience. The psyche, the state, and 
the universe are all subject to law. This is reflected too in 
our use of the words IIjudge" and IIjudgementll to refer to both 
public lega,l procedure and private individual thought. For 
a judgement, as distinct from a mere opinion or impression, 
claims, as Kant says, a universality and an objectivity which 
is valid for all, whether it is the product of a single mind 
or a public tribunal. 
"Quest" in the 1 iterary sense derives from the 
medieval notion of trial or ordeal by battle, in which the 
cause is tried by a contest of champions in the belief that 
God will defend the right. The concept of the knight errant, 
therefore, may be seen as a romanticized version of the Roman 
guaestor or "ques terti, whose functi on it is to succour the 
innocent and to prosecute evildoers. In this perspective, the 
victims who call upon the court to assign a champi'on to their 
cause are "postulants", and the actiones become not forensi'c 
debates but actions in the military sense, in which the 
defeat of the criminal is judged to be sufficient probatio of 
the case. And this type of quest is perhaps the single most 
fundamental form of action in The Faerie Queene, for in each 
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book a knightly hero champions an innocent victim against a 
series of malefactors in the form of dragons, enchanters, and 
monsters. This general pattern is re-enforced by the innumerable 
occasions in each book in which the knight succours other 
victims of lesser antagonists. By virtue of Spenser's 
allegorical method, each quest ;s both a public and a private 
or subjective tribunal. Acrasia, for example, is not merely 
an external, Circe-like enchantress, but the power of 
undisciplined emotion within the soul, and Guyon's struggle 
against her is a cleansing of his society and his psyche at 
once. Thus the Spenserian quest unites the outer and inner 
meanings of Ilinquiryll, and displays whole the relation between 
order in society and sanity in the mind, both under the form 
of justice. The metaphor of the human mind as courtroom is 
only a particular instance of this general theme, and we find 
it explicitly developed in Canto IX of Book II, where Guyon, 
exploring with Arthur the Castle of Alma, is permitted to enter 
a chamber which symbolizes the faculty of judgement within the 
individual. In this room, the walls 
Were painted faire with memorable gestes

Of famous Wisards; and with picturals 

Of Magistrates, of courts, of tribunals 

Of commen-wealthes, of states, of pollicy,

Of lawes, of judgements, and of decretals, 

All artes, all science, all Philosophy,

And all that in the world was ay thought wittily. 

(II, ix, 53) 
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Guyon ;s thus enabled, by virtue of the allegorical method, 
to enter into his own head, so to speak, and to observe the 
process by means of which the disordered imagination of 
Phantastes ;s regulated and tempered by judgement. It is no 
accident that this chamber resembles a courtroom, for it is 
by means of the faculty of judgement that emotion, sensory 
experience, and fantasy are reduced to the rule of law 
defined and regulated by what Sir Philip Sidney called lithe 
• d . /I 10JU g1ng power, as social behaviour is regulated by the 
court. In a very broad sense, the entire poem can be seen as 
the exploration of this one concept -- as a vast and intricate 
image of the tribunal of the human mind, doing battle with 
its own lawless emotions in the pursuit of truth, which is 
a1so jus t i ce .. 
But the literary archetype of the quest is only a 
particul ar instance of a much more pervasive intimacy of 
relation between literature and the juridical process. The 
trial or courtroom drama appeals to the literary imagination 
because it is a symbol of the human quest itself. It is 
concerned with primary religious and metaphysical questions 
of guilt and innocence, appearance and reality. It offers an 
orderly procedure by means of which complex and multitudinous 
questions can be sifted and examined, claims branded true or 
10 Sir Philip Sidney, An "Apologie for Poetrie, edi"ted 
by J. Churton Collins, Oxford, the Clarendon Press, 1907, p. 17. 
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false, and "final" judgements rendered on vexing and 
troublesome issues. It incorporates within it, symbolically, 
that which human nature loves best -- a fight. At the same 
time, it is governed by a strict formal code which not only 
ensures decorum and gravitas but -- at least potentially -­
the aesthetic satisfaction of clarity of structure, for its 
proceedings have a clearly identifiable order of beginning, 
mi ddl e, and end. It is not acci denta 1 that so many drama ti c 
works consist entirely of, or incorporate within themselves, 
the representati on of a tri a 1. Works as diverse as Aes chyl us I 
Oresteia and Gilbert and Sullivan's Trial £l. Jury, Wouk's The 
Caine Mutiny and Shawls Saint Joan, Plato's Apology and Kafka's 
The Tri a 1 attes t to the central i ty of the court i nq ui ry in the 
body of verbal rituals that re-enact the dominant concerns of 
Western eul ture. 
The close relation between drama and the rhetoric 
of the courts is recognized by Aristotle in the Poetics .. 
The Plot, then, is the first principle and, as it 
were, the soul of a tragedy: Character holds the 
second place .•.. Third in order is Thought -~ 
that is, the faculty of saying what is possible
and pertinent in given circumstances. In the case 
of oratory, this is the function of the political 
art and of the art of rhetoric; and so indeed the 
older poets make their characters speak the 
language of civic life; the poets of our time, the 
language of the rhetoricians. 11 
In the next paragraph, he says that Thought (dianoia) "is 
11 Aristotle, Poetics, translated by Ingram Bywater, 
in An Introduction to Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon, The 
Modern Library, New-Vork, 1947, p. 633. 
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found where something is proved to be or not to be, or a 
general maxim is enunciated." Clearly, Aristotle believed 
that the tragic poet was entitled -- even required -- to 
"prove someth"ing" and to lIenunciate general maxims II • The 
ranking of Thought after Plot and Character stresses, of 
course, his view that drama is above all representation. 
But he could not have argued that poetry is "somewhat more 
philosophical than historyll,12 nor have placed such value on 
anagnorisis or "discoveryll as a structural device, had he 
not believed that poetry was capable of grasping and expressing 
truth. The parallel functions of drama and trial are disclosed 
in the belief that each is intended to discover the truth that 
underlies the appearances of human experience. 
Another important document in cl assi cal literary 
criticism is the brief and anonymous Tractatus Coislinianus 13 
of the fourth century A.D. Essentially, it is the application 
of the Aristotelian analysis of tragedy to the comic form. 
Its treatment of dianbia clarifies still further the legal or 
juridi ca1 archetype wi thi n the com; c form. 
The parts of dianoia are two: a) opinion (pistisl
and b) proof (gnosis). Proofs are of five sorts: 
1) oaths; 2) compacts; 3) testimonies; 4) trials 
ordeal s; 5) 1aws. 14 
12 Ibid., p. 636. 
13 Reprinted in Theories of Comedy, edited by Paul 
Lauter, Doubleday Anchor Books, New York, 1964, pp. 21-23. 
14 Ibi d ., p. 22. 
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This makes even more explicit the view that literature has 
as its function the attainment of truth. "Thoughtll, in comedy, 
moves from opinion, uncertainty, confusion, "mere appearance li 
(pistis) to proof, certain knowledge, resolution, and "realityll 
(9nosis). The "forms of proof" cited are not merely the chief 
instruments of juridical procedure, but also, recognizably, 
mechanisms which poets tragic and comic use to generate the 
action of their dramas. The importance of Oedipus' oath that 
he will cleanse Thebes of the miasma, or Hamlet1s oath to 
avenged his murdered father, are well-known examples. Faustus 
launches the action of his damnation by making a compact with 
Mephistophilis. The importance of the nuntius, or messenger, 
who is usually an eye-witness of the events that he reports, 
in carrying forward the action of a play, is exemplified "in 
Oedipus Tyrannus and Samson Agonistes. The trial itself, or 
its substitute the ordeal, is to be found in Saint Joan, The 
Scarlet letter, and Heart of Darkness. The classic pattern of 
Shakespearean comedy is the attempt to escape from a harsh or 
crue1 1 aw -- as in The Merchant of Veni ce, Measure for Measure, 
or A Midsummer Night1s Dream. 
One of the striking differences between the tragic 
and the comic form is precisely their characteristic treatment 
of such "forms of proof" as oaths, compacts, laws, and ordeal s . 
In tragedy, the protagonist is generally unwilling or unable 
to evade the consequences of the oath or compact to which he 
13 
commits himself. Lear, for example, though counselled against 
the division of his kingdom, adheres to his resolve and thus 
preci pi tates the tragi c outcome. The acti on of a comedy, by 
contrast, revolves around the problem of releasing the 
protagonist from his oath, or from the rigour of the law, 
while preserving the appearance of fidelity to it. Tragedy 
insists upon the universality of law, comedy upon its 
relativity. In both forms, however, the medtanisms of oath, 
compact, and ordeal may be conceived as procedures for testing 
initial assumptions (pisteis) about life or human nature, and 
thus as forms of proof or disproof (gnosis) which lead from 
the hypothetical charge or accusation to the reasoned judgement 
of condemnation or acquittal. In tragedy, they re-enact 
Aeschylus' formula of disillusionment: poiema, pathema, mathema 
(Ilpurpose, passion, perception"). In comedy, they re-enact the 
central myth of Christian culture, in which mankind is condemned 
under the law and then miraculously liberated through the 
intervention of a hero who con~s not to subvert the law but 
to fulfill it. 
Of course, The Faerie Queene is epic, not drama. This 
means that the quest for truth, justice, and "rea,lity ll ;s 
presented not as forensic debate but in terms of action and 
imagery directly narrated. This permits Spenser to go beyond 
the external representation of consciousness and to enter into 
14 
a vast and intricate symbolism that mediates between privacy 
and pub 1i ci ty, and perm; ts the appearance of II characters II, 
like the River Thames or Florimell, who are personified 
natural agencies, not human beings. Thus, instead of being 
focussed purely on an external, pub 1i c, and soc; a 1 form of 
justice, the poem can present the quest as both private and 
individual on the one hand and macrocosmic on the other. 
There are, therefore, three different perspectives on each of 
the knightly adventures in the poem. In the first place, each 
quest is a IIpublic" process in which a hero, representing the 
ideal order symbolized by Gloriana's court, cleanses the social 
order by executing justice on an evildoer. But at the same 
time, the quest is a private struggle, a psychomachia, in 
which a specific habitual disposition of the soul conquers 
psychic enemies within its own gates. Finally, each quest has 
implications for, and is affected by, natural, cosmic processes 
such as the cycle of summer and winter, or supernatural 
realities such as the justice and charity of God. Ultimately, 
all three levels are identified "in the tribunal of Nature 
which passes judgement upon Mutability's claim to sovereignty. 
In each case, and on every level, the action 1s a 
conflict of appearance and reality, pistis and gnosis. We 
mi ght borrow the style of St. Thomas and descri'be, for 
example, the action of Book I in this manner: lilt seems that 
15 
man is in thrall to the great dragon, Satan, who is not only 
the Prince of This World but the Arch-Lie (archimago) within 
the soul .... On the contrary, Holiness frees both human 
society and the individual soul from the illusion of 
separateness and damnati on. II Of course, each quest combines 
these three levels in different proportion, Books I to III 
emphasizing the private, subjective side~ and Books IV to VI 
the public and objective. In every case, however, the action 
aims at a form of justice -- religious justification in Book 
I, the rational discipline of the emotions in Book II, the 
harnessing of erotic impulse to social and civic purposes in 
Books III and IV, social justice ;n Book V, the just relation 
of man and man in Book VI, and cosmic justice in the Cantos 
of Mutabi 1i ty . 
CHAPTER TWO 
Nature~ Contemplation, and the One 
The acti on of Book I of The Faeri'e Queene is 
presented throughout ;n the terms of the activity of intellect. 
The companion of the Red Cross Knight, Una, is repeatedly 
referred to simply as "Truth". His very first battle is waged 
against the Dragon Error in lithe Wandering Wood ll (i .. e .. the 
Forest of Error). His next antagonist ;s Archimago, an 
enchanter who prevails by means of false images. He is further 
deceived by Duessa, who is also called "Fidessa" (Faith). He 
is ultimately cured of his su'cidal despair in The House of 
Holiness and on the Hill of Contemplation. His ultimate 
victory over the great Dragon results in the exposure and 
puni shment of Archimago and Duessa. Unmistakably, therefore, 
the adventures of Redcross are conceived as adventures of 
the mind (which of course does not mean that they are in any 
way unreal). Whatever else the concept of IIHoliness" contains, 
it is clear that as a virtue it depends upon the intellectual 
power of the mind by which the true is distingUished from the 
fa 1se. 
The true beginning of Redcross' ordeal occurs when, 
accord-jng to the medullary verse of Canto II, 'Ithe guilefull 
great Enchaunter parts/ The Redcrosse Kni ght from Truth. II In 
terms of the action, Redcross is parted from Una by Archimag9, 
16 
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who, having failed to destroy the knight's faith in Una by 
concocting a deceitful dream, fashions two evil spirits into 
false images of Una and a young squire, and displays them to 
Redcross IIknit .... in Venus' shameful chaine." The effect 
upon Redcross is to darken his mind with passion, jealousy, 
and anger. 
The eie of reason was with rage yblent (I, i, 5). 
Redcross immediately sets out, taking with him Una's dwarf 
and leaving her to awake and find herself alone. 
The following verses stress the notions, first 
of duality and then of multiplicity. Archimago exults at 
having divided Una and St. George Uinto double parts", and 
we learn that he possesses the capacity to take many shapes. 
For by his mighty science he could take 
As many formes and shapes in seeming wise 
As ever Proteus to himself coul d make (1, ii, 10). 
Thus Redcross and Una have been duplicated, so to speak, in 
the false images of Archimago and Duessa, a demonic parody of 
the original couple. Duessa (now called Fidessa) appears as 
the Whore of Babylon, falsely claiming to be Una. The real 
Redcross, still blinded by passion, fails to detect the 
imposture. 
He in great passion all this while did dwell, 
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More busying his quick eies her face to view 

Then his dull eares to hear what she did tell (I, ii, 26). 

The encounter wi th Fradubio, 1I0nce a man . . . now 
a tree ", is a 910ss upon what has happened to Redcross. For 
Fradubio ("Brother Doubtll) too was once betrothed to a fair 
1ady "tha t di d then sh i ne as the Morni ng Sta rll, but had been 
enchanted by the "hell ish science ll of Duessa even to the point 
where he had been ready to kill her. Then he had been bereft 
even of his senses by "wi cked herbes and oyntments II so tha t 
he has become a human vegetable, doomed to stand in the Forest 
of Error till he be bathed in a "living well. II 
This Canto, in other words, depicts in the separation 
of Redcross and Una the loss of what Dante called il ben 
ld'intelletto -- lithe good of intellect ll • Redcross, his eye 
of reason blinded, imposed upon by false images, his single 
vision made multiple by Protean error, is in danger of losing 
his human faculties altogether, as Fradubio has. What has 
occurred is a fall from unity, first into duality and then 
into multiplicity, from reason to passion, certainty into 
doubt, and rationality into irrationality. 
The consistent equation of unity with truth suggests 
The Divine Comed~: The Inferno, Canto III. 
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that the action of Book I ;s the allegorical statement of a 
definite philosophical doctrine. And the philosophic system 
which pre ...eminently equates truth and unity is that of the 
Neo-Platonist, Plotinus. Essentially, Plotinus' system may be 
considered as the result of a prolonged and intense meditation 
on the nature of unity as such, as the title of Ennead III, 
viii -- "Nature, Contemplation, and the Oneil -- suggests. What 
is it, asks Plotinus, that enables us to recognize individual 
entities like rocks and trees and animals? His answer is "their 
uni tyll -- that whi ch preserves thei r i denti ty in the fl ux of 
experi ence. 
To grasp the oneness in a tree, that is, its stable 
principle, or in an animal, or in a soul, or in the 
universe, is to grasp, in each of these cases, that 
which is most PQwerful and precious. 2 
But the act of "grasping" this oneness reveals another 
kind of unity -- the unity subsisting between the knower and 
the known. 
There i~ identity between knowing subject and known 
object. 
This identity of the soul of the knower with the form of the 
object known (what the scholastics called "knowledge by 
connatural i tyll) is what we know as Inte11; gence. As long as 
we remain within the realm of Intelligence, however, this 
2Joseph Katz, The Philosophy of Plotinus: 
Representative BOOKS from the Enneads, Appleton-Century- Crofts, 
New York, 1950, p. 56. 
3Ib i d., p. 49. 
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identity of knower and known cannot be a true unity, since it 
is always possible to separate it into its subjective and 
objecti ve s1 des. 
Intelligence is at once intelligence and the 
intelligible, and therefore two things at once. 4 
By a further act of contemplation, however, the 
rational soul can cease to apprehend the intelligible world 
as a multiplicity of known objects and grasp the essential 
unity of Intelligence itself, which, Plotinus insists, is not 
within Intelligence but beyond it. 
Since intelligence is a sort of seeing, that is, a 
seeing that is active, it really ;s a potentiality 
that passes into an actualization. One will 
therefore nave to distinguish in it form and matter. 5 
Reflection upon the form of Intelligence, apart from its matter, 
reveals a unity beyond Intelligence, the sustaining principle 
of knowing as such -- something beyond Intelligence as 
Intelligence is beyond Soul. That sustain~ng principle Plotinus 
calls simply liThe Oneil. 
The One is none of the totality of things, but prior 
to all things. 6 
These four levels of being -- Body (or Nature), Soul, Intelligence, 
and The One, known as "hypostases" or "emanations ll -- are at 
once principles of generation and principles of knowledge. All 
4Ibid., p. 53. 

5Ibid., p. 56 

6Ibid., p. 55. 
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individual things in the totality of the physical universe 
are generated by Soul, which in turn is generated by Intelligence, 
which itself emanates from The One. Thus, in Plotinus ' system. 
there is Doth a deductive and an inductive perspective, from 
The One to Nature or from Nature to The One, respectively. 
The multiplicity of Nature (or Body) is at the furthest remove 
from the generati ve power of The One, and so comes 1as t oj n the 
order of generation. It is, on the other hand, the starting 
point for the mind, which, by progressively unifying its 
experience, can rise in true Neo-Platonic fashion from creature 
to the Uncreated, from the manifold to The One. 
Since contemplation rises from nature to the soul, 
and from the soul to Intelligence ... it follows 
that the knower, because he aspires to intelligence, 
must then within Intelligence be identical with 
what is known. 7 
By a still further act of contemplation, the mind 
can abstract from what it knows and concentrate only upon the 
act of knowing, which is a penultimate unity depending only 
upon the Form of Un; ty i tse 1f, or The One. The act of know; n9, 
in other words, is made possible only by Unity. 
If this principle begets Intelligence, it necessarily 
is simpler than Intelligence. 8 
Yet contemplation is not present merely within Intelligence. 
It is present wherever there is unity or a principle of 
7Ibid. p. 51 

8Ibid., p. 54. 
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stabi 1i ty. 
All beings, rational but also irrational animals, 
plants and the earth that begets them, aspire to 
contemplation and are directed towards that end, 
and ... due to their differing capacities some 
really achieve contemplation while others only 
accomplish a reflection or image of it. 9 
The contemplation of merely natural entities ~- that is, those 
without rational souls -- resembles rational contemplation as 
sleep resembles consciousness. 
If one desires to attribute some sort of cognition 
or sensation to nature, these resemble the usual 
cognition and sensation only as those of a man who 
is asleep resemble those of a man who ;s awake. 10 
Thus, within Plotinus' system, it is possible for 
the mind to move back and forth over the entire range of the 
levels of knowledge, from the infra-intelligent knowledge 
which depends on dreams or images, and is associated with the 
vegetative soul, to the intelligent knowing within the rational 
soul, to the supra-intelligent knowing which puts the mind in 
contact with The One, which is beyond Intelligence. Necessarily, 
however, Plotinus conceives any movement from unity to duality 
or multiplicity as a deterioration or a ufall ll • 
The soul grasps its object better the more rational 
it is .... Her contemplation rests within her 
and she is sure of her posses~ion of her object. 
The greater thi s assurance, the more peaceful is 
9Ib i dof p. 42. 
lOIbl"d., pp..45 -46 . 
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The loss of such assurance is therefore the loss of unity, and 
it comes about because the mind is unable firmly to grasp the 
form of its knowing, and becomes lost in the mu1tiplicity of 
the objects known. 
Since (contemplation and the object of this contemplation) 
are identical, how does it happen that their unity
becomes manifold? It becomes manifold because it 
does not contemplate unity. 12 
When, therefore, Redcross is parted from Una in 
Spenser's poem, the action is an analogue of the divorce of 
the mind from its assured possession of the truth through 
contemplation. Archimago personifies the loss of intellect, 
since his power depends upon mere images, to a Neo-Platonist 
the very lowest form of mental activity. He is not only the 
architect of lies but himself the Arch-Lie, and Duessa and 
Fradubio his instrument and his victim respectively. The 
Wandering Wood of Error is itself the state of mind that 
possesses the tree-man, Fradubio, and threatens the intellect 
of Redcross. Thus Redcross' entry into the Wandering Wood, 
his loss of Una, the deceit of Archimago and Duessa, and the 
encounter with Fradubio are all, in a sense, perspectives on 
the same event -- Redcross' fall from the assured grasp of truth 
11Ibid., p. 48 

12 Ibid ., p. 52. 
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into the irrational multiplicity of the natural world. 
From this point on, until the reunion of Redcross 
and Una in Canto IX, the action dramatizes the human condition 
that results when intelligence and the intelligible are 
divorced from one another, to produce the state of error which 
William Blake denounced as a "cloven fiction" -- the belief 
that the mind and the universe are discrete and therefore, in 
existentialist terms, "absurd ll Una's adventures take place • 
in the forest, where she is befriended first by a lion and 
later by a group of satyrs, who represent the level of knowing 
below that of the rational soul. Redcross ' adventures take place 
in the House of Pride, which resembles a Tower of Babel, or 
the house built upon sand of the parable, and he escapes 
Lucifera and the preposterous parade of the Seven Deadly Sins 
only to fall victim to the giant Orgoglio. 
The insistence upon Redcross l susceptibility to 
Pri de deri ves from the fact that he represents i nte 11 ect depri ved 
of its proper object, and therefore turned in upon itself, 
nursing the illusion of self-sufficiency_ Una, on the other 
hand, suggests the condition of truth separated from the 
receptive intellect, wielding its own influence over irrational 
nature, whose contemplation resembles intelligence as sleep 
resembles waking. Such a separation between intellect and the 
wholeness of truth is an archetype of decadence, oe;'n9 
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re-enacted today by the neo-primitives, who fear Intellect 
because it is "unnaturalll and "irrelevant", and by effete 
rationalists who endlessly analyze the act of knowing and yet 
are unable to attain the assurance and peace that, according 
to Plotinus, the grasp of truth bestows. 
Of course, the separate adventures of Una are 
coloured by another strand of the allegory, the religio­
historical, in which Una represents the true faith abandoned 
by England in the days of Mary and forced II underground" by 
Roman Catholic persecution. Redcross' dalliance with Fidessa, 
which results in his capture by Orgoglio (Philip of Spain) 
represents the demoralizing influence of false doctrine. In 
a purely philosophical perspective, however, the separation 
of Redcross from "Truth" by means of Archimago's deceit is a 
Neo-Platonist account of the clouding of man's intellect and 
hence an analogue of the descent from the realm of Form into 
the natural world. While Redcross' imprisonment in the dungeon 
of Orgoglio suggests the sufferings of Englishmen in the 
prisons of the Inquisition, it ;s also a Platonic image of the 
mind imprisoned within the cave of sensory experience. Arthur's 
rescue forces Redcross, painfully, to return from the darkness 
of the cave -into the sunlight of true knowledge once more. 
His sad dull eies, deep sunk in hollow pits,

Could not endure th' unwonted sunne to view (I, viii, 41). 
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But the Redcross who emerges from Orgoglio's dungeon 
is not the hopeful young man who had, with the optimism of 
youth. lightly undertaken the task of freeing Una's parents 
from the oppression of the Great Dragon. His encounter with 
the complexities and duplicities of life, and most of all the 
awareness of the strength of his own passions, has almost 
fatally undermined his moral sense. He must, if he is to right 
the wrong done to Una and her parents, be prepared to dispense 
justice, but his confusion of mind has left him with an 
overwhelming sense of his own worthlessness. When he encounters 
Despair, the landscape itself suggests his former error through 
images of cave and forest (I, ix, 33-34). Rashly, he invokes 
"j usti ce" agai nst Despai r for the wrong he has done to Si r 
Trevisan: 
Thou damned wight, 
The author of this fact we here behold, 
What justice can but judge against thee right, 
With thine own blood to price his blood~ here shed in sight? (I, ; x, 37) 
But Despair turns the very concept of justice against 
him. 
"What franticke fit,1I (quoth he) IIhath thus distraught 
Thee, foolish man, so rash a doom to give? 
~'hat jus ti ce ever other judgement taught 
But he should die who merits not to live?" 
(I, ix, 38) 
The indictment of Redcross that follows is the crisis of 
Book I. Remorselessly, Despair forces Redcross to realize 
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that in his present state he ;s completely incapable of just 
action. Sir Trevisan has been driven to suicide by his own 
guilty mind. Is it not just to give every man his due? Is death 
not preferable to life in any case? 
Sleep after toyle, port after stormy seas, 
Ease after warre, death after life, does greatly please. 
( I, ix, 40) 
Uneasily, Redcross invokes the Socratic argument that the 
soldier must not leave his post until he is bidden. Despair 
brushes this aside in a speech that, through its thematic 
relationship with the description of the Garden of Adonis in 
Book IV and the trial of Mutability, raises issues that underlie 
the thematic structure of The Faerie Queene as a whole. 
"ls not his deed, what ever thing is done 

In heaven and earth? Did not he all create 

To die againe? All ends that was begonne: 

Their times in his eternal book of fate 

Are written sure, and have their certain date. 

Who then can strive with strong necessitee 

That holds the world in his still chaunging state, 

Or shunne the death ordayned by destinie?" 

(I, ix, 42) 
In a world ruled by mortality and doomed to inevitable 
death, what meaning can IIjustice" have? Is not death just for 
everyone by the Almighty·s decree? And what right has Redcross 
to talk of justice in any case -- Redcross, who early lost his 
way in the Forest of Error, and even yet has not found it again? 
For he that once hath missed the right way
The further he doth goe, the further he doth stray. 
(I, ix, 43) 
28 
Then, like the egalitarian Giant in Book V, Despair invokes 
the scales of justice. 
Thou, wretched man, of dea th hast grea test need, 

If in true ballaunce thou wilt weigh thy state. 

(I, ix, 45) 

Has Redcross not committed sins enough to ensure his 
condemnation? Is not God's law that every sinner shall die? 
Will Redcross implicate Heaven in his own guilt by asking to 
be pardoned? 
The effect of this measured cynicism on Redcross is 
devastating. His conscience tells him that all Despair has said 
is true; he is appalled by the "ugly vew of his deformed crimes" 
(48). We are reminded of Archimago, the initiator of the 
process, once again. Redcross is paralyzed 
As he were charmed with inchaunted rimes (I, ix, 48). 
He sees nothing before his eyes but death, and the wrath of 
God. When Despair puts a dagger into his grasp, Redcross' 
hand "quake(s} and tremble(s) like a leafe of Aspin greene" (51). 
These memories of Archimago and the tree-man Fradubio are 
deliberate; they suggest that Despair's indictment is the 
cUlmination of the process begun by Archimago when he parted 
the kni ght from IITruth lJ • 
Redcross' state of mind is that known in theological 
terms as alienation -- the sense of having been cut off from 
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God's grace, rejected, condemned, and p1aced under sentence 
of death. The term itself is intensely significant, because 
it connotes "otherness", the sense of divorcement from God .. 
The diagnosis of Redcross· state of mind stresses precisely 
thi s meani ng of the word, for when he emerges from the "sad 
house of Penaunce ll , Charissa instructs him 
Wrath and hatred warely to shun 
That drew on men Gods hatred and his wrath. 
(I, x, 33) 
The chiasmus in these 1ines makes the point vividly. The 
"wrath and hatred II of Redcross were di rected fi rst at Una 
but, for this very reason, ultimately at himself. It was his 
conviction of alienation from God -- his 1I 0 therness il -- that 
made him see only death, made him aware of God only as a 
source of wrath. The opposite of alienation, of course, is 
communion. The point is that Redcross ' separation from Una 
in Canto II, the result of his failure of intellect which led 
him to see only the multiplicity of nature and not the unity 
of all things in God, has led necessarily to his conviction 
of otherness and hence his own total worthlessness. His pride t 
symbolized by his imprisonment in the dungeon of Orgoglio, is 
me re ly an as pect of hi sal i enati on.. Pa radoxi cally, both stem 
from the illusion of separateness, of self-sufficiencYt and 
this, in turn, has been generated by his loss of vision and 
his descent into the manifold illusions and false images of 
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; 
the merely natural world. 
The treatment of such alienation, or of its secular 
equivalent, depression, is complex and difficult. Therapy 
cannot be based solely on emotional factors like sympathy, 
reassurance, and forgiveness, for what is at fault is essentially 
the patient's vision. His despair arises from the image he 
has of himsel f, and mere reassurance and ilacceptancell cannot 
change that. He must be brought to see, to understand himself 
and his situation. The cure for alienation, in other words, 
must be addressed first to the patient's intellect, for unless 
he sees the doctor's reassurance as having the value of truth 
it will have no effect. 
Spenser's account of the treatment of Redcross 
demonstrates his awareness of this fact. For in Caelia's house 
he is introduced first to Fidelia and Speranza. Charissa, we 
are told, is unable to greet him because of her late confinement. 
It is only after Redcross has submitted to the discipline of 
Humilta, Zele, Reverence, and Obedience that he is admitted 
to the schoolhouse of Fidelia, where his "dull eyes ll are opened 
to the "celestiall discipline" of the "sacred Bookel!, from which 
she instructs him 
Of God; of grace; of justice; of free will (I, xi, 19). 
This part of the treatment, addressed to the intellect, seems 
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at first only to intensify his conviction of sin, but then 
Speranza takes over his instruction and provides the hope and 
reassurance that enable him to continue. Spenser recognizes 
the intensely painful nature of the treatment. We are reminded 
continually of Redcross l "painll (I, x, 24), of the IIfestering 
sorell (25), of his "grieved conscience ll (25). But Patience and 
Penance combine to help him endure. It is only then that he 
is able to meet Charissa, newly released from childbed. Redcross, 
having learned IIhimself to cherish ll , can now learn charity 
towards others. The implication is that he himself is the 
child to whom Charissa has just given birth. Redcross is born 
again through the revival of his hope and his new ability to 
be charitable towards himself and. others. 
Significantly, his redemption ends, as it began, 
with treatment directed towards the clarification of his vision. 
He is allowed to climb the Hill of Contemplation -- a composite 
image recalling the three holy mountains of Christian humanism, 
Sinai, Olympus, and the Mount of Olives -- where he has a 
vision of the holy city of Jerusalem, and for the first time 
learns his true identity. Like Plato's guardian, he wishes to 
remain on the heights, but his unfinished quest compels him 
to descend once again, where he is re ... united with Una. 
A major theme, then, of the action of Book I is the 
question of the justification of the agent of justice himself. 
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Redcross must learn~ before his supreme ordeal, that Justice 
is God's prerogative -- that the merely natural man, convicted 
of sin himself, cannot safely presume to dispense justice to 
others. The justification of Redcross consists in the arduous 
process of recovering his single vision through patience and 
contemplation, which culminates in and is symbolized by his 
re-union with Una. Having recovered from the multiple illusions 
of Archimago, and thus from the illusion of his own self-
sufficiency, he can proceed to mete out justice to others, not 
as a separate and personal idiosyncrasy but as the symbol of 
the re-established harmony between man and God. 
In this respect, Book I challenges comparison with 
two other classic studies of the prosecution of justice -­
Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus and Shakespeare IS Han~et. In those 
plays, as in Book I of The Faerie Queene, a young man undertakes 
to rescue an entire society from a curse that ;s the consequence 
of wrongdoing. And, in those plays, as in Spenser's poem, the 
greatest obstacle to the hero's quest is the fact of his own 
conviction of sin. The chorus in Sophocles' play makes this 
point about Oedipus: 
For he, 0 Zeus, sped his shaft with peerless skill, 
and won the prize of an all-prosperous fortune; he 
slew the maiden with crooked talons who sang darkly; 
he arose from our land as a tower against death. And 
from that time, Oedipus, thou hast been called our 




in great Thebes. 

But now whose story is more grievous in men's 

ears? Who is a more wretched captive to fierce 

plagues and troubles, with all his life reversed? 

Alas, renowned Oedipus! The same bounteous 

place of rest sufficed thee, as child and as sire 

also, that thou shouldst make thereon thy nuptial 

couch. Oh, how can the soil wherein thy father 

sowed, unhappy one, have sufficed thee in si1ence 

so long? 13 
Hamlet too suffers a similar fate, for his early confidence 
in the righteousness of his own cause ends finally in his own 
conviction and arrest as a killer, and ultimately issues "in 
a faith in Providence that leads him to abandon personal 
attempts at revenge altogether. Both plays begin in a resolve 
to direct justice, in the form of hatred and wrath, outwards 
upon others, and end in the realization that this same wrath 
must be directed inwards upon the self. 
Book I of The Faerie Queene differs from Oedipus 
Tyrannus and Hamlet, however, in that it is conceived as a 
comic, not a tragic, action. Redcross recovers from his own 
self-hatred, and is finally able to visit just punishment upon 
the Dragon. And he is able to do so because he has been brought 
to see that the perspective of Despair is false, the product 
of Archimago's duplicity. Archimago is of course the arch­
image, the Father of Lies himself, and in this sense is 
identical with the Great Dragon whom Redcross finally overthrows. 
13 S1 r Rt ch~rd Jeob, Thi~tra.gedt~s· of: Sopflot1as, 
Transl ated into Engl ish Prose, Cambridge Universi ty Press, 
Cambridge, 1957, p. 47. 
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Thi s IIcemi c" treatment of the quest for jus ti ce 
would not have been possible for Spenser had he not been able 
to draw upon the classic source for all discussions of justice 
Plato's Republic. In that work the same pattern is apparent, 
for Socrates finds that the attempt to define justice raises 
two other intimately related questions, namely, "What is the 
just state?" and "What is a just man?" The Republic, in other 
words, discloses the same conceptual pattern as do Oedipus 
Tyrannus, Hamlet, and Book I of The Faerie Queene; the quest 
for justice in the state is inseparable from the quest for 
justice in the soul. Plato, having identified the three 
elements or principles within the soul the appetitive, the 
irascible, and the rational -- goes on to argue that justice, 
whether in the state or in the individua1, has regard to 
that which is within and in the true sense concerns 
one's self, and the things of one's se1f. It means 
that a man must not suffer the principles in his 
soul to do each the work of some other and interfere 
and meddle with one another, but that he should 
dispose well of what in the true sense of the word 
is properly his own ... and having ... made 
himself a unit, one man instead of many, self­
controlled and in unison, he should then and then 
only turn to practice. 14 
To act justly, then, a man must first make of himself 
ria unit, one man instead of many, self-controlled and in unison." 
The concept of unity can be seen to be central to the concept 
14 Plato, The Republic, 443d (translation by Paul Shorey, 
the Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, 1953). 
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of justice, and it is clear why, in Spenser's poem, Redcross 
must regain contact with Una if he is to prosecute his quest 
successfully. But, as Plato also says, this harmony or unison 
in the soul is the essence, not only of justice, but of the 
other virtues as well; of bravery, because the irascible 
elerrent will come to the aid of the rational in a fight for 
a just cause; of wisdomt because the irascible and appetitive 
elements will obey the rational; of sobriety, for the same 
reason; of honesty and trustworthiness and piety and all the 
rest, because "each of the principles within him does its 
own work in the matter of ruling and being rUled. 1t 15 This is 
the well-known Platonic principle that all the virtues 
coincide in one virtue -- the virtue of knowledge. This 
perhaps explains Spenser's single-minded concentration upon 
intellect in Book I as the means by which "Holiness" ;s to 
be achi eved . 
As a Christian, Spenser included in the concept of 
Holiness a dimension that was not vouchsafed to Plato. But the 
Holiness of Book I. in true humanist fashion, comprehends Plato, 
Plotinus, and the Book of Revelation, not as antagonistic but 
as complementary visions. He keeps insisting that all the virtues 
are one. 
o goodly golden chain, wherewith yfere 





As the converse of this, Redcross, having been parted from Una, 
displays all of the vices that are the counterparts of the virtues 
celebrated in the rest of the poem. He ;s subject to Lucifera, 
who brings with her all of the deadly sins. He is intemperate 
in his passion, inconstant in his abandonment of Una, unjust 
in assuming that she is untrue to him, discourteous to her and 
then to himself. His redemption from despair is the re-acquisition 
of the corresponding virtues. Holiness, in short, ;s presented 
in Book I as the awareness of unison within the soul and with 
God, and it includes within it all the virtues. 
If, as this study assumes, the quest for justice is 
a central theme of The Faerie Queene as a whole, it is altogether 
logical that Book I should raise the question of personal 
justification in theological terms, for without this as basis, 
justice in the state or in the world at large must remain an 
ideal impossible of human attainment. But such justification 
is a function of what would be called in idealist terms the 
transcendental unity of virtue. Redcross attains to an awareness 
of that unity through contemplation, by means of which he ;s 
able to re-establish contact with truth and recover from the 
state of religious alienation. His attainment of Holiness is 
the foundation for the exploits of all the knightly champions 




The Tempering of the Mind 
IIThose who cannot remember the past," said George 
Santayana, "are condemned to repeat it. II His aphorism has 
often been used to show the practical value of the study of 
nistory, but in its ori'g;nal context it concerns, not the 
macrocosmic historical process, but the microcosmic perceptual 
one. . 
The process of counting is perhaps as simple 

an instance as can be found of a mental operation 

on sensible data. The clock, let us say, strikes 

two: if the sensori'um were perfectly e1asti c and 

after receiving the first blow reverted exactly 

to its previ'ous state, retaining absolutely no 

trace of that momentary oscillation and no altered 

habit, then it is certain that a sense for number 

or a facul ty of count; ng caul d never a rise. The 

second stroke would be responded to with the same 

reaction which had met the first. There would be 

no summation of effects, no complication. However 

numerous the successive impressions might come to 

be, each would remain fresh and pure, the last 

being identical with the first. One, one, one 

would be the monotonous response forever ..•. 

Such, too, is the idiot's life: his liquid bra;'n 

transmits every impulse without resistance and 

retains the record of no impression. 1 

It follows that our memory of past experience is a 
conditi'on of our awareness of novel ty. If our present expertence 
lGeorge Santayana, The Life of Reason, Charles Scribner1s 





were not recognizably a continuation of the past, we could not 
identify what is genufnely new in it. And this in turn is the 
condition of all growth and development, both in the world and 
in ourselves. Without the record of past experience, there 
would be "a new world every day, with the same fool to live 
in it." 2 But in fact existence is full of repetitions which 
are not exact repetitions, of tropes, rhythms, periodtcities, 
and cycles. This is true not only of the external world, where 
colours, the seasons, light and darkness, sounds, and the 
very atoms and electrons observe regular rhythmic patterns, 
but of our interior world as well, where breath, pulse, 
heartbeat, sleeping and waking, exemplify the same kind of 
alternatio'n. Cognttion, therefore, is always re-cognition; 
the act of knowing always implies the notion of IIthis again". 
When we attend to what is repeated, aside from the 
fact that it is repeated, we are attending to the forms that 
our experience takes. These forms are the basis of all 
stabi 1i ty and order in our 1ives, and from them we deri ve our 
awareness of time itself. Necessarily, the forms are abstract; 
that is, they transcend the flux of our experience. In the 
intervals between their appearances in the world, they remain 
available to us in memory and anticipation. Yet, paradoxica.lly, 
2 Ibid., p. 27 .. 
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though they are abstract they are more real, in a sense, than 
the flux. Plato called them alethes, Ilunhiddenll, because they 
endure as objects of our inspection, whereas their exemplifications 
are ephemeral and evanescent~ Our developing experience of the 
world is nothing other than the developing store of forms or 
models for potential existences. 
The i dent; fi cati on of these endur; ng forms wi thi n 
the flux of experience is what makes the individual experience 
communicable -- that is to say, available to us when the 
moment of their exemplification is past, and to others separated 
from us by time or space. Our grasp of the forms is distinguishable 
from our experiencing of them, which -·;s only to say that thinking 
about life is different from living it. Living is ineluctably 
private and incommunicable; each one of us lives alone, shut 
up in the prison of the self. Only by thought can we escape, 
for it is thought that changes the private experience of the 
moment into public, enduring matter of fact. And the thought 
whi ch records the experience can i tse1f be recorded, in symbols 
which serve to direct other minds to the same forms within 
the; r experi'ence. It is the forms tha t we have in common, not 
the fl ux. 
In Book I I of The Faeri e Queene, Guyon, havi n9 fai nted 
as a result of the physical ordeal of spending three days in 





the renewed attacks of Pyrochles and Cymochles, is brought to 
the Castle of Alma, in which is figured the structure of the 
human body_ In the "stately Turret" of the castle, Guyon and 
Arthur are ushered by Alma into three successive chambers, 
occupi ed by fi gures representing the activi ti es of Imaginati on, 
Judgement, and Memory .. Phantastes, who inhabits the "forepart" 
of the turret, is a young man, intensely active and forever 
-in movement, who is nevertheless melancholy and lIof crabbed 
hew II , with the sharp staring eyes of the fool or the madman .. 
The chamber itself is painted with many co/lours and "infinite 
shapes II, some such as have never been seen before, and others 
"dai ly seen and known by thei r names .. \I 
And all the chamber filled was with flyes .... 
And all that fained is, as leasings, ta1es, and lies. 
(II, ix, 51) 
This chamber of "buzzing, blooming confusion" is 
an image of the human imagination, always feverishly active 
and marginally mad, the locus of insubstantial sensory 
phantasms, dreams, fictions, and vain imaginings. The shapes 
that are painted on the walls are an indiscriminate confusion 
of everyday shapes and myth; ca1 monsters --
Infernall hags, Centaurs, feendes, Hippodames, 
Apes, Lyons, Aegles, Owles, fools, lovers, children, Dames. 





The list includes both the creations of the undisciplined 
imagination and the human exemplars of this riotous faculty. 
The effect is not entireJy comic; in fact, it is slightly 
sinister. It expresses the conventional distrust of the 
imagination commonplace among Platonist and rationalist 
phi 1 osophers. 
In the second chamber, by contrast, we feel that 
we have stepped from a lunatic asylum into a court of law. 
Its wa11 s are 
painted faire with memorable gestes
Of famous Wisards; and with plcturals
Of Magistrates, of courts, of tribunals, 
Of Commen-wealthes, of states, of po1licy,
Of lawes, of judgementes, and of decretals, 
Al1 artes, all science, all' PhilosQphy, 
And all that in the world was ay thought wittily.
(II, ix, 53) 
To the modern reader, it may be something of a surprise to 
learn that this chamber, and not the chamber of Phantastes, 
is the province of art, and to find art~ science, and 
philosophy closely juxtaposed with the imagery of a court of 
law. But Spenser is making clear that art is not mere uncontrolled 
-imagination; it is sensory or imaginative experience regulated 
by judgement. As the courts regulate and define social expe'rience 
by bringing it under a code, so the judgement regulates and 
recognizes individual mental experiences by defining them and 
bringing them under a system of concepts .. This process is the 
origin not only of art (and Spenser means the useful arts, like 
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medi ci ne or carpentry, as we 11 as the IIfi ne II arts), but of all 
science and philosophy as well, which implies that the thought 
of the artist ;s not in-pr"inciple different from that of the 
scientist. It is significant, too, that the man "of ripe and 
perfect age lt , who rules the chamber, has "grown ri ght wi se and 
wondrous sage" by means of "continual practise and usage ll (54). 
This makes the point that lIartH is the result of repetition 
and custom; it is not the result of chance, nor is it dependent 
on the caprices of the fantasy_ Art, in other words, is a 
virtue in the Aristotelian sense; it is a permanent disposition, 
part of the acqui red character of the mind wh i ch "practi ses II 
it. 
The deliberations of the judgement depicted in the 
second chamber are passed on to the thi rd chamber, where 
Eumnestes rules, and recorded there in the form of II roflls and 
old records. some made in books, some in long parchment 
scrolls ll (II, ix, 58). Just as the courts, having defined and 
codified the social experiences of man, record their judgements 
in the form of legal precedents and rulings, so does the 
judging faculty of the individual mind, having ordered its 
sensory and imaginative experience, record this ordering in 
the forms of language, to be preserved and made available to 
the minds who come after. It is this ordering of experience 
which ensures the later availability of that experience to 
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ourselves and others. Eumnestes, though "halfe blind., and all 
decrepit in his feeble corsel! (II, ix, 55), ;s yet well 
recompensed for this physical decay in his "minds redoubled 
force." This too is part of the pattern, for the whole process 
of lIart, science, and philosophy" is one which resists decay 
in time, by translating experience out of its physical medium 
and retaining the record of its forms ;n thought and language. 
The presence of the child, Anamnestes, whose name and function 
call to mind the Platonic doctrine of recollection, indicates 
that none of the forms of experience can be lost, for these 
",hich cannot be found by the old man are recovered by. the 
child .... - which ;s to say that memory need not always have the 
forms of experience actually before it at all times; they may 
temporarily be obscured, but are always recoverable. 
The epistemological theory that informs these images 
is part of the tradition of Greek -- and specifically Aristotelian 
philos~phy. The essential distinction underlying it is that 
between pathos and ethos. The term pathos is usually translated 
lIemotion ll , but it also connotes suffering, as its etymological 
connection with "passion" suggests. IIA state of the soul, II says 
Aristotle, "is either an emotion (pathos), a capacity (dunamis), 
or a disposition (hexis). By an emotion," he adds, 
I mean desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, 
friendship, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity, and 
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generally those states of consciousness which are 

accompanied by pleasure or pain. 3 

The impl i cat; on here ; s that these states of consci ousness are 
merely "givenll, that they arise in us as the result of external 
circumstances; we suffer them, in the sense that we cannot call 
them into existence by a conscious act of the will. A capacity 
(dunam1s), on the other hand, is a power that we exert on our 
z 
emotions, while a disposition (hexis) is a settled and permanent 
state of mind that results from the exercise of our capacities 
over our emotions. The same pattern is evident in Spenser's 
images; the uncontrolled and undisciplined sensory and imaginative 
phantasms of the first chamber are pathe, converted by the judgement 
(dunamis) into settled and permanent states of mind (hexeis) 
that are preserved in the Chamber of Eumnestes. 
We have already noticed that the man in the prime of 
1; fe who presi des in the second chamber has become "ri ght wi sell 
through IIconti nua1 practi se and usage. II Th is too is good 
Aristotle, who says he d'ethike ~ ethous periginetai -- IIMoral 
or ethical virtue ;s the product of habit." 4 The words here 
translated as "ethical virtue" and "habit" are ethike and ethous, 
so that the Greek sentence has a nuance which is lost in translation. 
Ethos or habit (Spenser's IIpractise and usage ll ) creates ethos or 
3 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by H. Rackham, 
the Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
1926, II, v, 3. 
4 Ibi d., I I, i, 1 . 
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virtue. Ethos, then, is a permanent disposition in the soul. 
urn the widest sense, it includes all that is habitual and 
characteristic; in a limited sense, it expresses the habitual 
temper or disposition." 5 
Virtues, according to the Aristotelian formulation,6 
are not passions, because no one can be praised or blamed for 
feeling fear or anger, since these are involuntary experiences. 
Neither are they capacities (dunameis) , for these we have IIby 
nature", and the virtuous man is praised not because of the 
talents that were his at birth but because of what he has made 
out of them. Even those with little innate ability are praised 
for their virtue, while many more talented people are clearly 
recognized as vicious. A virtue, then, is a state of character, 
a permanent disposition to act in an ordered and disciplined 
way with respect to the passions. Underlying this view is the 
Greek assumption that all development or creative action must 
necessarily depend on a pre ...existing "material ll .. Virtue is 
not created ex nihilo, but through the establishment of an 
order within the personality that regulates pathe, the unruly 
inner experi ence whi ch at fi rs t cons is ts of chaot; c sensory 
impressions and emotional impulses .. The regulation of the 
sensory experiences creates intellectual virtue, while the 
regulation of the emotions produces moral virtue. 
5 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, translated by 
John Henry Freese, the Loeb-crassical Library, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1959, translator's note, p. 248. 
6 Nicomachean Ethics, II, v, 4. 
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One of the weaknesses in Aristotle's account of virtue 
is the obscurity that surrounds the question, "How does one 
become vi rtuous? II Hi s answer ;s that one does so by performi ng 
virtuous acts, since virtue is the product of habit. This 
presupposes, however, that we can first recognize virtue, by 
the rule that it is always a mean between excess and defect, 
Yet the mean in such cases ;s always relative to the person 
and the ci<rcumstances. It is all very well to point out, as 
he does, that lIit is the mark of the educated man to look for 
precision in each class of things just so far as the nature 
of the subject admi ts." 7 The fact rema ins that before one can 
practise virtue one must first be able to recognize it, and 
the "golden mean" offers us singularly little practical help 
in doing so. It appears that reason (ratio) can only tell us 
where to look; in order to recognize virtue under a given set 
of circumstances, we must employ not discursive reason but 
intuitive reason -- that is, Intellect. Moral virtue is not 
the product of blind habit, but of habit consciously employed 
upon what our intellect tells us is the virtuous act. 
This perhaps explains the subtle differenc~ that 
exists between Books I and II of The Faerie Queene. It is not, 
as A. S. P. Woodhouse contended in a famous and provocative study, 8 
7 Ibid., I, iii. 
a "Nature and Grace in The Faerie Queene ll English• 
Literary History, Vol. 16, No.3, September, 1949. 
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purely and simply the contrast between "Grace ll and "Nature ll • 
As his critics have pointed out, Grace abounds in both books. 
It is rather that Book I is related to Book II as intuitive 
reason, or intellect, is related to discursive reason, or 
judgement. Spenser's concept of Holiness is, as we have seen, 
closely related to the virtue of intellect. The apocalyptic 
imagery of Book I is part of this pattern, for apokalupsis 
;s the uncovering of that which had been hidden. When in Book 
II the Palmer says to Redcross, 
But wretched we, where ye have left your marke, 
Must now anew begin like race to runne (II, i, 32), 
he implies that Guyon's task is both a new beginning of the 
same task and a beginning of a new task. That is, Guyon's moral 
virtue is made possible by, and extends, the achievements of 
Redcross' "intellect" ;n Book I. 
What Guyon and Arthur have witnessed in the 
three chambers of the Castle of Alma is quite literally 
"temperance ll -- the activity of soul by which the merely given 
is discipl ined and ordered by the jlJdg~ment and made into a 
stable and permanent disposition. Temperance, in short, is the 
conversion of pathos into ethos. A link between Aristotle's 
formulation and Spenser's is to be found in Qu;ntilian, who tells 
us that the Roman word for pathos is affectus, and that ethos 
is translated as n'ios (from which is derived "moralll). And the 
9 Institutio Oratoria, VI, ii, 8. 
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tradition does not end there; the contrast between pathos and 
ethos reappears in later discussions of morality and poetry 
in Spinoza's distinction between the "inadequate ideas" of 
imaginatio and the "adequate ideas" of ratio, 10 in Wordsworth's 
doctrine of poetry as "emotion recollected in tranquillityll, 
and in Immanuel Kant's treatment of the differences between 
perception and judgement. 
As Sir Philip Sidney said, poetry is a central 
educative agency because it ;s concerned not merely with abstract 
ideas, as the philosopher must be, nor with the opacities of 
the temporal flux, as the historian is, but with both. 
Now doth the peerless poet perform both; for 
whatsoever the philosopher saith should be 
done, he giveth a perfect picture of it .... 
The philosopher with his learned definition . 
replenisheth the memory with many infallible 
grounds of wisdom, which, notwithstanding, 
lie dark before the imaginative and judging 
power, if they be not illuminated or figured 
forth by the speaking picture of Poesy. 11 
The historian is tied lito the particular reason of things, and 
not to the general reason of things .. 11 The poet, in uniting precept 
and example, unites also structure and process. Indeed, one might 
go so far as to say that in Sidney's formulation philosophy and 
history are to poetry as pathos to ethos, for poetry makes 
available their insights to lithe imaginative and judging pov.!er'. II 
10Benedictus Spinoza, Ethica More Geometrico 
Demons trata, Book II, Propositi on XXXVI. 
11Si r Phi 1i P Si dney, An Apo1ogi e for Poetri e, 
edited by J. Churton Collins, Oxford, the Clarendon Press, 1907, 
p. 35. 
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This, perhaps, is what he means by identifying poetry with lithe 
mistress-knowledge by the Greeks called Architectonike, which 
stands, as I think, in the knowledge of a man1s self, in the 
ethic and politic consideration.1I 12 Ethos, then, is self... 
knowledge ~- a settled disposition which, as enduring, is a 
permanent structure, and, as active, is an orderly process. 
Guyon's antagonist in Book II of The Faerie 
Queene is the II vile enchantress", Acrasia. The ethical concept 
of which she symbolizes the negation is that of krasis ("blending, 
mixture ll ). As Harry Berger puts it: 
Krasis as a blending, an ethical climate in the 
soul, becomes more than a starting point, more 
than an accidental happiness of disposition; it 
becomes the result of a course of action on the 
part of the human will -~ an acquired virtue 
which may be perfected by Grace. 13 
The two victims of Acrasia, for whom the Palmer acts as IIpostulantll, 
establish a pattern of deadly self-contradiction between two 
closely related aspects of the soul - ... a pattern that is sustained 
throughout Book II. Mortdant and Amavia, the giver of death and 
the lover of life, symbolize not only the Aristotelian scheme 
of excess and defect but an almost Freudian marriage between 
eros and thanatos which suggests that the passionate desire for 
death, against which Redcross too had had to struggle in Book I, 
12 Ibid., p. 42. 
13Harry Berger Jr"", The Allegorical Temper, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1957, p. 113. 
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is an inevitable concomitant of all natural life. The pathos 
suffered by these two -- and indeed by all the other exemplars 
of intemperance in Book II -- is rooted in the pathology of 
sexual love. Mortdant, who has fallen under Acrasia's spell, 
is poisoned with the charm 
Sad verse, give death to him that death does give,
And losse of love to her that loves to live. 
(II,;,55) 
His death in turn prompts Amavia to suicide. Guyon's gloss upon 
these events ;s as follows: 
Behold the image of mortalitie, 
And feeble nature clothed with fleshly tyre,
When raging passion with fierce tyranny
Robs reason of her dew regalitee,
And makes it servant to her basest part; 
The strong it weakens with infirmitee, 
And with bold furie armes the weakest hart: 
The strong through pleasure soonfalles, the weak 
through smart. 
But temperance .•. with golden squtre 
Betwixt them both can measure out a meane; 
Nether to mel t ;'n pl easures whott desyre, 
Nor frye in hartless griefe and doleful tene. 
(I I, 1, 57-8) 
Other exemplars of intemperance in Book II continue 
this pattern. The strife between Sansloy and Huddibras is carried 
on within the context of their courting of Medina's sisters, 
Elissa and Perissa. Phaon1s seizure by Furor is rooted in sexual 
jealousy. Pyrochles and Cymochles, the one symbolic of fiery 
ungoverned wrath and the other of weak and watery sloth, are 
both in thrall, sexually, to Acrasia. Mammon tempts Guyon with 
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the hand of his daughter, Philotime. Maleger, who attacks the 
Castle of Alma when Guyon departs, is a grisly self-contradiction, 
since he is at once sick unto death and enormously strong, 
"most strong in most infirmitee _ Throughout Book II, Guyon ISII 
adversaries are fatally self-contradictory entities, bound 
together in the identity of sexual or familial relationships 
in such a way that the death of one member seems to provoke the 
suicide of the other. The sinister identity between eros and 
thanatos, the immoderate love of life and the love of death, 
is made explicit by the carpe diem song sung in the Bower of 
Bl i ss _ 
Ah! see, whoso fayre thing doest faine to see, 

In springing flowre the image of thy day. 

Ah! see the virgin rose, how sweetly shee 

Doth first peepe foorth with bashfull modestee, 

That fairer seems the lesse ye see her may_ 

Lo~ see soone after how more bold and free 

Her bared bosome she doth broad display; 

La! see soone after how she fades and falls away. 

So passeth, in the passing of a day, 
Of mortall life the leafe, the bud, the flowre; 
Ne more doth fl ouri sh after fi rst decay,
That earst was sought to deck both bed and bowre 
Of many a lady' and many a Paramowre. 
Ga ther therefore the Rose wh i 1 est yet is prime,
For soone comes age that will her pride deflowre; 
Gather the rose of love whilest yet is time, 
Whilest loving thou mayst loved be with equall crime. (II, xii, 74-75) 
Here, of course, the argument inverts the terms, 
saying, "Because there must be death, let there be sexua1 love. 11 
But all the exemplars of incontinence and intemperance in Book 




death. Pathos -- love merely suffered -- is the cause, not 
the result of death. 1I The Genius who presides in the Bower of 
Bliss is not lithe celestiall power, to whom the carel Of life, 
and the generation of all/ That lives, perteines" (II, xii, 47), 
but liThe foe of 1i fe That secretly doth us procure to 
fa 1111 (I I, xii, 48). 
The Neo-Freudians, who have had so great an influence 
upon the formation of what is called "the counter-culture" by 
espousing so intemperately wha t they call lithe 1 i fe-val ues II , 
and who see in the control and discipline of pathe a symptom 
of the death-wish, are here shown to be mistaken. For it is the 
uncontrolled affirmation of mere impulse that destroys Amavia 
and Mortdant, Pyrochles and Cymochles, Impotence and Impatience, 
Mal eger, and the rest. When Guyon destroys the Bower and captures 
Acrasia in the cunningly-woven net of reason supplied by the 
Palmer, he releases Acrasia's victims (all but one) from their 
merely animal existence and restores to them the possibility 
of life on a truly human level. 
Guyon's quest, like all of the knightly adventures 
in The Faerie Queene, is a quest for justice, for the IIjust 
revenge II ca 11 ed for by Amavi a in Canto I. Thi sis made 
unmistakably clear in the oath sworn by Guyon over her grave. 
But, ere they di d their utmos t obsequy, 

Sir Guyon, more affection to increace, 






The dead knights sword out of his sheath he drew, 

With whi'ch he cutt a lock of all their neare, 

Which medling with their blood and earth he threw 

Into the grave, and gan devoutly sweare; 

"Such and such evil God on Guyon reare, 

And worse and worse, young orphan~ be thy payne, 

If I, or thou, dew vengeance do forbeare, 

Till guiltie blood her guerdon do obtayne. 1I 

( I I, i, 40 -41 ) 
This oath, an example of one of the "forms of proof" mentioned 
in the Tractatus Coislinianus .as a means of distinguishing between 
pistis and gnosis, illusion and reality, begins the process by 
means of which Guyon withstands the batterings of pathe in their 
various forms and reveals that the mere affirmation of life, 
wi thout ethi cal control, leads inevitably to death. This is the 
meaning of the artificiality of the Bower of Bliss, which 
superficially seems to full of life but is actually a form of 
death. 
The crucial moment of the quest is Guyon's visit to 
the Castle of Alma, where he is',permitted to pass through the 
Chambers of Imagination, Judgement, and Memory. Significantly, 
Imagination (Phantastes) displays characteristics very much 1ike 
those of Maleger himself. He too is a mixture of life and death. 
He is young, but has a I1crabbed hew ll and IIsharp, staring eyes. 1I 
His counterpart in the Chamber of Judgement, however, is "a man 
of ri pe and perfect age." The juri di cal process suggested by the 
Chamber of Judgement i tse 1 f represents the means of pass i ng from 
pistis to gnosis, from the illusion of life to its true possession, 
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from appearance (the "1 eas i ngs, tales, and 1i es II of Phantas tes ) 
to reality -- that is, to 
All artes, all science, all Philosophy,
And all that in the world was ay thought wittily_ 
(II, ix, 53) 
But the passage from pist;s to gnos15 achieved by means of 
the reasoned judgement is also the passage from pathos to ethos, 
from mere passive suffering to the active control of our humanity. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
The Wounds of Love 
The subject of Books III and IV is the fall from the 
purely natural, sinless order of generation symbolized by the 
Garden of Adonis into the human world where sex means violence 
and misery. This is marked, first, by the dominance of wintry 
imagery. Marinell and Florimell are presumed dead, and are 
actually in the custody of sea-gods whose abode is the watery 
world. Florimell's place is taken by a simulacrum made of snow, 
which deceives everybody. The parallel with the myth of Pluto 
and Persephone iss trong -- both Fl orime11 and Amoret are he ld 
prisoner seven months. The onset of winter marks the passage 
from the perpetual spri n9 of the Garden of Adoni s into the 
fully cycl i cal worl d of ordinary nature .. At the same time, it 
marks the beginning of human sexuality and its attendant dangers. 
The Garden of Adonis is an amoral world where the concept of 
sin is irrelevant, but in the human psyche, which is not 
vegetative but rational, the advent of sexual desire means 
suffering, misery, and the risk of the kind of metamorphosis 
which overtakes Hellenore and Malbecco. 
The vi rtue of Chasti ty must thus contend wi th very 
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different antagonists than did Redcross and Guyon. They 
represented the kind of virtue in which intellect has a crucial 
role to play in bringing harmony out of human impulses, and 
to a large extent their dramas are enacted within the individual 
soul. But the sexual love treated in Books III and IV for the 
first time means the beginning of social relationships; virtue 
must now become more public. This is why Chastity and Friendship 
can be so closely identified. 
The injustice which gives rise to Britomart1s adventure 
is committed by Busirane upon Amoret, who, having left the Garden 
of Adonis to marry Scudamour, was kidnapped and imprisoned, 
chained and surrounded by a wall of fire. Unlike the adventures 
in Books I and II, and in spite of what Spenser says in the letter 
to Raleigh, this injustice is not brought to the court of Gloriana 
by a postulant. It happens by the way, so to ~peak, to come to 
Britomart1s attention while she is searching for her own lover, 
Artegall. This suggests that the eventual salvation of Amoret 
is not something imposed upon human nature from and by a higher 
order of beings -- the faeries -- but ;s achieved on a purely 
human and natural level, which thus rises to meet the ideal order 
represented by Gloriana and her court. 
Thus there is a determinate sequence of levels of the 
action, from the supernatural realm of Holiness "in Book I, to 
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the achieved harmony of human reason in Book IIf to the more 
mysterious depths of human sexuality in Books III and IV. This 
sequence may be conceived as parallel to the scheme of Plotinian 
hypostases described in Chapter Two of this study.l It moves 
from the supra-intelligent unity achieved by Redcross, to the 
intelligent harmony of human impulse symbolized by Guyon, to 
the infra-intelligent level of sexual harmony represented by 
Britomart. As the poem progresses j we move from heaven to 
earth, unity to multiplicity, intellect to emotion. As Plotinus 
said, the "contemplation" practised by vegetative nature 
resembles real contemplation as sleep resembles waking. This 
explains why the action of these two books depends so heavily 
upon images. Arthur's quest for Gloriana ~- another example of 
the human order rising to meet the ideal -- was initiated in 
a dream. SimilarlYj Britomart sees Artegall first ;n Merlin's 
magic glass. As the action proceeds, images and illusions acquire 
still greater importance. The subsidiary action revolves around 
the fa 1 se image of the snowy Fl or"ime11. The wa 11 of fi re that 
imprisons Amoret proves to be an illusion, as does the shadowy 
Masque of Cupid which flits through Busirane's castle in the 
hours of darkness. 
But unlike the false images created by Archimago in 
Book I, which are conceived as essentially evil, the images of 
1 Chapter Two, pp. 19-22, above. 
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Book III are ambiguous. The sight of Artegall provokes Britomart 
at first to tears, since it appears that he is but a phantom. 
Merlin explains that her love is not only not in vain, but is 
to be the instrument of Providence. 
Most noble Virgin, that by fata11 lore 

Hast learn1d to love, let no whit thee dismay 

The hard beginning that meets thee in the dore, 

And with sharp fits thy tender hart oppresseth sore: 

For so must all thinges excellent begin; 

And eke enrooted deep must be that Tree 

Whose big embodied branches sha1l not lin 

Till they to hevens hight forth stretched be 

It was not, Britomart, thy wandering eye

Glauncing unwares in charmed looking glas 

But the streight course of hevenly destiny, 

Led with eternal providence, that has 

Guyded thy glance, to bring his will to pas: 

Ne ;s thy fate, ne is thy fortune ill, 

To love the prowest knight that ever was. 

Therefore submit thy wayes unto his wi1l, 

And do by all dewe meanes thy destiny fu1fill. 

(III, iii, 21-24) 
Yet though her love is foreordained, and intended to 
establ ish justice (i .e. a union wi th Artegall) and lI un iversal 
peace" eventually, it is also,deeply painful. It is as if 
Britomart, like Amoret, must be deeply wounded in her nature 
in order that II Eros , builder of cities" 2 can bring about the 
fi no estab 1 is hment of IITroynovaunt II. The image of the deep 
wound in human nature created by sexual love appears variously 
2 W. H. Auden, II In Memory of Si gmund Freud ll , in 
Collected Shorter Poems, 1927-1957, Faber and Faber, London, 




in Books III and IV as the wound inflicted upon Adonis by the 
boar and the wounds inflicted by Cupid1s arrows. In the Garden 
of Adonis both the boar that killed Adonis and Cupid himself 
are controlled, subject to the government of Venus. But within 
human sexuality they rage as fiercely as ever. Britomart is 
wounded several times, in her fight with Marinell and, later, 
by Busirane. The wound that she inflicts upon Marinell fulfills 
the prophecy that he would be dismayed or killed by a woman. 
Amoret in the House of Busirane is "transfixed with a cruel 
dart ll (III, xii, 31), while Belphoebe, attempting to cure 
Arthur's squire, unintentionally wounds him even more deeply 
with a dart from IIher faire eyes and gracious countenance ll 
(III, v, 42). Amoret is kidnapped by a savage, lustful figure 
with the tusks of a boar. For a time it is feared that Florimell 
has been wounded or killed by the Hyena-like beast that IIfeeds 
on womens flesh" (III, vii, 22). 
The bestiality to which human nature can be reduced 
by sexual love is insisted upon throughout Books III and IV. 
Even the gods are not exempt from it, for Spenser includes 
references to many myths of metamorphos is, in whi ch Jove, 
Apollo, and Proteus adopt bestial forms in the pursuit of 
mortal women. The story of Paridell IS rape of Hellenore re-enacts 
the destruction of Troy, leaves Hellenore the thrall of satyrs, 
and leads Malbecco to forget his humanity entirely. The ravages 
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of lust are represented in other bestial forms -- in Argante 
and Olliphaunt, who represent a1l the perversions of the sexual 
instinct both masculine and feminine, and in the stories 
recounted to Britomart by Glauce in Canto II of Myrrhe and 
Biblis, who committed incest, and of Pasiphae, who loved 
Jove in the form of a bull, and Narcissus, who fell in love 
with his own image and "faded to a watery flowre ll (III, ii, 45). 
The four heroines of Books III and IV -- Florimel1, 
Amoret, Be 1 phoebe, and Bri tomart -- represent four di fferent 
kinds of response to the wounds caused in human nature by 
sexua 1 love.. Fl orime11, upon hear; n9 of the II dea th II of Mari ne11 , 
simply resorts to headlong flight, which exposes her to the 
unwanted attentions of beasts anq bestial men. Amoret, in 
contrast, is imprisuned, chained by lust, and surrounded by 
a wall of fire, so that even after her rescue she deeply fears 
even innocent human contact .. Belphoebe suggests the type of 
human character who reacts in the opposite way by adopting a 
position of isolation from men altogether and practising a 
militant virginity. Only Britomart, comforted and guided by 
Merlin 1s prophecy, displays a ba1anced and harmonized 
response that combines desire and constancy, passion and 
control. The fact that she combines martial prowess with 
feminine beauty suggests' that she is the most integrated of 
the heroines, so that she is better able to endure separation 
from her 10ver than are Florimell and Amoret. 
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The resolution of sexual conflict is conventionally 
symbolized by the reconciliation of Mars and Venus, and Britomart 
combines these aspects of human nature in her role as warrior 
maiden. In contrast to Amoret, she has a strength and courage 
that enable her to withstand the pain of love and to conquer 
her would-be assailants. At the same time she complements the 
salvagesse sans finesse of her lover, Artegall, by mollifying 
his rude violence with the feminine qualities of mercy and 
forgiveness. Thus the union of Britomart and Artegall repeats 
in a new form the resolution of Redcross' psychic conflict, 
since it too symbolizes the tempering of justice by mercy or 
charity. The eventual marriage of Britomart and Artegall means 
not on ly the reso 1 uti on of the battl e of the sexes but also the 
establishment of human amity symbolized by the order and peace 
of Troynovaunt. They are thus intentionally contrasted with 
Paridell and Hellenore, who represent the power of unbridled 
lust to destroy whole societies and reduce man from civility 
to the amoral state of nature. The release of Amoret from the 
House of Busirane is the signal for the development of the vision 
that counteracts the destructive capacities of sexual strife. 
This is the modified sexual urge that results in friendship and 
concord, symbolized first by Cambell and Triamond and later by 
Amyas and Placidas. 
If the existing books of The Faerie Queene constitute 
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"a unifi ed epi c structure" ~ as Northrop Frye assumes ~ 3 then 
the transition from Book III to Book IV is a pivotal point in 
that structure. This transition is a very gradual one, since 
the stories of Scudamour and Amoret, Marinel1 and Florimell 
are not concluded until the end of Book IV, and Britomart1s 
continues into Book V. The atmosphere of Book IV, however, 
is in contrast to that of Book III in that the emphasis is 
placed not upon the violent misery of love, nor upon the 
bestiality of corrupt love, but upon the bond of amity that 
can grow out of sexual strife. The first example of such 
amity is the eventual concord achieved by Cambell and Triamond 
through the intervention of Cambina. Hitherto, with Redcross, 
Guyon, and Britomart, the hero has been fighting an essentially 
private battle, a psychomachia. Now the emphasis gradually shifts 
to the more pub1ic and social virtues, as depicted first by 
Couragious Cambell and stout Triamond, 

With Canacee and Cambine linked in lovely bond. 
(IV, ii, 31) 
Indeed this quartet is a double figure or four, so 
to speak, since Triamond embodies the souls of his brothers 
Priamond and Diamond, so that Cambell and Triamond themselves 
are a foursome. Spenser I s use of the name "Agape II to denote 
the power whi ch has uni ted three natures in one being appears 
3 Northrop Frye, liThe Structure and Imagery of The 
Faerie Queene ll , in Fables of Identity: Studies i!!. Poeti c 




to suggest some overt Trinitarian symbolism, but if this was 
his intent it must be admitted that the effect is very odd 
indeed. It is almost blasphemous to depict Agape as dabbling 
in the black arts and then to point out, as Spenser does, that 
the attempt to prolong human life this way is "fond and vaine" 
(III, iii, 2). There. is perhaps a pun intended on "concordll, 
since Agape obtains her favour from the Moirae -- Clotho, 
Lachesis, and Atropos. But the inspiration for this figure is 
classical, not Christian. Cambina's wielding of the Caduceus, 
and her use of Nepenthe to make the rivals forget their hatred, 
suggests that whatever the "concordll might be, it is not rooted 
in any supernatural relation to the Christian God. 
This abortive beginning of concord ;s immediately 
destroyed in any case by the tournament organized by Satyrane 
for Florimell's girdle, which is marked as fallacious from the 
beginning by the fact that the prize of arms ;s to be the snowy 
Florimell. In this tournament Artegall fights Britomart and is 
overcome. In other words, the story seems to have fallen back 
from the concord of early cantos into the theme of sexual strife 
once more. Gradually, however, the theme of concord asserts 
itself once more, and Spenser seems to be working toward the 
idea that sexual love can be not only the root of all honour, 
in the courtly love tradition, but also the beginning of a 
Platonic ascent to heavenly beauty through friendship. Of the 
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Jlthree kinds of lovell, he says, 
Hard is the doubt, and difficult to deeme, 
When all three kinds of love together meet, 
And do dispart the hart with power extreme, 
Whether shall weigh the balance downe; to weete, 
The deare affection unto kindred sweete, 
Or raging fire of love to womankind, 
Or zeale of friends combined with vertues meet: 
But of them all the band of vertuous mind, 
Me seemes, the gentle hart should most assured bind_ 
(IV, ix, 1) 
This idea is illustrated in the friendship of Amyas and 
Placidas, which is instrumental in achieving a second fourfold 
concord in their double marriage to Aemylia and the redeemed 
Poeana. Similarly, the four knights representing kinds of corrupt 
love (Druon, Claribell, Blandamouf, and Paridel1), doing battle 
as before for the false Florimell, are brought into accord with 
Britomart and Scudamour by the intervention of Arthur_ 
The movement from sexual strife towards concord that 
constitutes the structure of Books III and IV is given conceptual 
support in Scudamour1s description of the Temple of Venus in 
Canto X. It is significant that, in contrast to both the island 
of Acrasa's Bower of Bliss and the Garden of Adonis, the Temple 
of Venus is an island which has been fortified by human art. 
Spenser carefully points out that on this island 
All that nature by her mother-wit 
Could frame in earth, and forme of substance base, 
Was there; and all that nature did omit, 
Art, plaYing second natures part, supplyed it. (IV, x, 21) 
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The Bower of Bliss, we recall, was a place of corrupt art, of 
artifice deceitfully imitating nature, while the Garden of 
Adonis was purely natural, outside the human ethical process 
a 1 together. Thi sis1and represents the concord between nature 
and art, the result of the sexual and generative urge (pathos), 
mitigated and sublimated by ethos. This emphasis upon the use 
of eros as a spur to achievement is clearly present ;n the 
inscr"iption below Scudamour1s shield: 
Blessed the man that well can use his b1isse. 

(IV, x, 8) 

As a logical concomitant of this concept of love, 
Spenser finds a place on the island not only for erotic love 
but also for the exemplars of friendship in the Platonic tradition, 
those who 
loved not as these for like intent, 
But on chaste vertue grounded their desire ... 
Which in their spirits kindling zealous fire, 
Brave thoughts and noble deedes did evermore aspire. 
(IV, x, 27) 
This pattern of concord between nature and man, and man and 
man, is completed by references to the concord within nature. 
The figure of Concord, who tempers the animosities of her twins, 
Love and Hatred, is not only the mother of Peace and Friend~hip 
but a 1 so the source of all vi t~] i ty and orderl i ness in Nature: 
By her the heaven is in his course contained, 

And all the world in state unmoved stands, 

As their Almightie maker first ordained, 

And bound them with inviolable bands; 
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Else would the waters overflow the lands, 

And fire devoure the ayre, and hell them quight,

But that she holds them with her blessed hands. 

She is the nourse of pleasure and delight, 

And unto Venus grace the gate doth open right. 

(IV, x, 35) 
The steady insistence upon the resolution of conflicts 
in nature and in man culm-inates in the figure of Venus herself, 
who conceals beneath her veil the natures of both man and woman 
in a single androgynous figure. 
She hath both kinds in one; 
Both male and female, both under one name. 
(IV, x, 41) 
She is thus the unity of Mars and Venus, Artegall and Britomart, 
Marinell and Florimell, Scudamour and Amoret, the figure of 
ideal harmony between man and woman that is the basis of order 
both in nature and inhuman society. 
Spenser uses the conventional allegorical figures 
of the courtly love tradition -- Doubt, Delay, Daunger -- to 
indicate that successful courtship is a mora1 achievement, 
something for which nature supplies only the basic urge, which 
must be discipl ined and made constant in the face of innumerable 
obstacles and possible corruptions. As ethos, the love which 
; s sues in the chas ti ty of rna rri age and is the subs tance of accord 
and friendship is removed from the amoral state of primitive 
nature and is placed firmly within the context of its own ethical 
world, for with love and friendship there is the basis for 
civilization. This latter fact is made clear by the destiny of 
Britomart and Artegall, whose love is to undo the ravages of 
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the first Troy and achieve the civility symbo1ized by Troynovaunt. 
The adventure of Artegall in Book V, therefore, is not a new 
beginning but a continuation of the movement out of nature into 
ethos depicted in Books III and IV -- as, indeed, Britomart's 
role in his quest indicates. 
The concl usion of Book IV, in whi ch the great concourse 
of rivers is both the occasion and symbol of the re-union of 
Marinell and Florimell, marks the end of the wintry and watery 
images that have dominated the action of these two books ever 
since Amoret left the primal innocence and simplicity of the 
Garden of Adonis. When he sees Florimell once more, Marinell 
regains his spirits 
As withered weed through cruel winters time 
That feels the warmth of sunny beames reflection. (IV, xii, 34) 
Taking pride of place in the wedding procession is the bridegroom, 
the River Thames, weari ng the ci ty of Troynovaunt 1 ike a coronet, 
and attended by the smaller tributaries that f]ow into the Thames 
in the a rea of London -- the Ouze, the Ch urn, and the Charwe 11 
from upstream, and the Kenet, Thetis, Cole, Breame, Lee, and 
Darent. When the Thames is united to the Medway in marriage, 
Spenser completes a grand codal re-statement of the theme of 
Books III and IV, for it is an image of concord, order, and 
harmony in nature and in man which is crowned by the image of 
London, like a coronet spanning the great confluence of waters 




Books III and IV constitute a distinct structure 
within the poem, for while Books I and II depict an order imposed 
upon human nature from above, in the form of the Holy Unity 
of God, or the steady control of anarchic impulse by the Faerie 
knight, Guyon, Books II and IV plunge the reader into the depths 
of nature below man, whence rises the generative impulse wherein 
I 
man is one with nature, and depict the gradual process by which 
the sexual urge, potentially productive of misery, strife, and 
madness, ascends to the human and ethical level at which it 
is productive of ordered familial and social life, and makes 
possible, through the Platonic notion of an ascent to heavenly 
beauty, a return of man's spirit towards the wholly Othe'r Being 
which is the subject of Book I. The midd1e two sections of the 
poem, in other words, turn back to link up with the first two, 
and produce a closed fourfold scheme of the levels on which 
human life is lived -~ the natural, the social, the ethical, 
and the intellectual. 
In the letter to Raleigh, Spenser explains that 
Scudamour's quest was undertaken in response to the comp1aint 
of "a Groome ll , who brought news that "a vile Enchaunter, called 
Bus;rane, had in hand a most faire Lady, called Amoretta, whom 
he kept in grievous torment, because she would not yield him 
the pleasure of her body.1I 4 According to the version of the 
4 . 
"Letter to Raleigh", QQ.. cit., p. 4. 
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story presented at the beginning of Book IV, however, it 
appears that Scudamour had already won Amoret as his love before 
she was spirited away by Busirane. In the poem as we have it, 
then, Scudamour is the postulant, and his appeal is not to one 
of Gloriana's knights but to Britomart. His compla1nt is couched 
in the same form as the others; it is, like them, an appeal 
for jus ti ce. 
o soverayne Lord! that sit'st on hye, 
And raignst in bliss emongst thy blessed Saintes, 
How suffrest thou such shamefull cruelty
So long unwreaked of thine enemy?
Or hast thou, Lord, of good mens cause no heed? 
Or doth thy justice sleepe and silent ly?
What booteth then the good and righteous deed, 
If goodness find no grace, nor righteousness no meed? 
(III,xi, 9) 
He asks assistance from Britomart because he himself has been 
unable to penetrate the wall of fire surrounding the castle 
of Busirane. This development parallels the events of Books 
I and II, in each of which Prince Arthur comes to the rescue 
of one of Gloriana's knights. Yet in those earlier books, 
Redcross and Guyon go on to achieve their quests without further 
help from Arthur. In Book III, Britomart supplants Scudamour 
entirely as the rescuer of Amoret. The narrative structure of 
Books III and IV thus represents a considerable departure, with 
its complex interlacing of stories and its proliferation of 
agents, from the simpler and more direct narratives of Redcross 
and Guyon. Scudamour's story is a comparatively minor element 
;n contrast to the adventures of Britomart and the story of 
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Florinell. 
Spenser's adoption of this contrasting narrative 
technique can be accounted for by reasons other than the mere 
desire for variety. Books III and IV present the quest for 
justice in a form that complements its pattern in earlier books. 
Redcross and Guyon are directed from the beginning to seek out 
a specific evildoer and to rescue or avenge specific victims. 
In so doing, they encounter Arthur, who is not a Faerie knight, 
engaged in his own more personal quest for Gloriana. In Books 
III and IV this pattern is reversed. Britomart, engaged in her 
own personal quest for Artegal1, encounters Scudamour, who has 
been unsuccessful in his attempt to free Amoret and punish 
Busirane. The effect of these parallels and contrasts is to 
suggest, as has been said, that an ideal of order being imposed 
on nature and man from levels above them (the will of God, the 
ideal human society as represented by Gloriana 1 s court) meets 
its complement in an appetite for order that arises from the 
depths of nature and the human psyche (the loves of Arthur and 
Britomart). Thus the image of the union of two lovers is a 
constant symbol of the order and harmony within«<nature, the 
soul, and society at large which is the essence of Plato's 
concept of justice. The love of Marinell for Florimel1, Scudamour 
for Amoret, Britomart for Artegall, Arthur for Gloriana, and 
Redcross for Una are the same Love which obtains at every level 
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of existence within nature and brings into harmony the 
elemental strife of water and earth, man and woman, soul and 
intellect, man and God. The same symbol is retained in Books 
V and VI in the eventual union of Britomart and Artegall and 
the love of Calidore for Pastore11a. It appears in concentrated 
an d powerful form in the fi gure of the andro'gynous Venus and 
in a variety of lesser forms throughout the poem (Medina, Concord, 
Venus and Adonis, Isis and Osiris, and elsewhere). 
The only protagonist who is not closely identified 
with a feminine partner is Guyon, although even he is presented 
with an image of himself (the Castle of Alma) ruled by a woman. 
His defeat of Acrasia, however, is a necessary preliminary to 
the later versions of the reconciliation of sexual conflict. 
It shows how the eternal opposition of masculine and feminine 
is not to be reconciled, and is to that extent a negative 
instance of the theme. As Nort~rop Frye remarks, 5 Guyon is 
a rather pedestrian hero, a fact not wholly accounted for by 
the theft of his horse. His presence in Book II is balanced, 
in any case, by that of Belphoebe, his feminine counterpart, 
in Books III and IV. 
Books III and IV, therefore, are central to the 
thematic structure of The Faerie Queene in more than a merely
,-' . 
spatial sen-s'::e .. 13yvirtue of the dominant personality of 
S Northrop Frye, liThe Structure and Imagery of The 
Faerie Queene", in Fables of. Identity: Studies 'in. Poetic 
Mythology, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1963, p.7S. 
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Britomart, these books present a counter-movement to the actions 
of Books I and II, in which the motivation of the action is 
not the impersonal, abstract ideal of justice but the personal, 
concrete ideal of love. The first four books of the poem, 
taken together, constitute yet another form of the fusion of 
masculine and feminine qualities which ;s the architectonic 
symbol of the poem. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
The Legend of Justice 
In Book V, Spenser returns to the more direct and 
linear narrative structure used in Books I and II. Indeed, 
the story of Artegall is, if anything, more linear than those 
of Redcross and Guyon, since we are supplied with an account 
of Artegall IS training in the lore of justice at the hands 
of Astraea and a plain narrative of the complaint of Irena 
which leads to his undertaking the quest. Like Redcross and 
Guyon, Artega11 encounters a seri es of mi nor antagoni s ts -­
Sir Sanglier, Pollente, the egalitarian Giant, Amidas and 
Bracidas -- to whom he brings justice as a preparation for 
the climactic struggle with his major foe. And like Redcross 
and Guyon he fai 1.s in hi s penul timate task and must be rescued 
by another -- in this case, Britomart -- before he can go on 
to his final victory. 
Yet Book V has a complexity of its own which derives 
from its position immediately following III and IV. In those 
books, the dominant symbol has been the androgynous figure 
who unites mas,culifle and feminine in a complex unity of two 
conflicting powers. This image is of great importance in Book 
V as well, since the ideal of Justice celebrated here is also 
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a union of Justice and Mercy_ The images, however, are more 
ambivalent than in earlier books. There is no single figure 
who unites both qualities. The best that Spenser can do is 
an approximation, as in the figures of Isis and the croco~le, 
or Mercil1a and her lion, or Isis and Osiris, who are alternate 
personae for Britomart and Artegall. Indeed, Artegall, whose 
motto is Salvagesse sans finesse, and his groom Talus, the 
iron man who has no capacity for pity, figure forth the 
roughness and terror of Justice, the fact that as an ideal 
it can have no respect for persons. Britomart complements this 
component of the ideal with the fem"inine qualities of pity 
and compassion. The action of Book V revolves around the all 
but irreconcilable conflict between these two aspects of 
Jus ti ce. 
Book V contains motifs from the earlier adventures 
of Redcross and Guyon which aim at establishing the relation 
between Justice and the Holiness and Temperance exemplified 
in those earlier episodes. As Artegall says to the egalitarian 
Gi ant, 
Truth is one, and right is ever one. 
(V, ii, 48) 
Guyon appears in Canto III, where he restrains Artegall from 
doing violence to Braggadocio. Thus Spenser seems to be saying 
that Truth and Temperance, as he has defined them earlier, 
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are necessary adjuncts to Justice~ The conflict between these 
two virtues, indeed, is analogous to the major conflict within 
the ideal of Justice; truth ;s truth, and is no respecter of 
persons, and yet the just judge must also temper his decrees 
by reference to the particular circumstances of each case. 
The concept of Justice developed in Book V, then, draws upon 
the conceptual framework of preceding books in order to produce 
a fully rounded explication. The exposition of the concepts 
of Holiness, Temperance, Chastity, and Friendship is a necessary 
preliminary to Book V, just as Book V is the logical implicate 
of earl ier books. 
In the very first canto, Spenser comp1ains of the 
decay of the ancient ideals of Justice, Truth, and Peace. He 
makes it clear, before the action of the book begins, that 
ideal justice is not to be found in the world as we know it; 
Astraea is fled to the heavens, where as Virgo she represents 
the puri ty of the i deal no longer to be seen 
Mongst wicked men, in whom no 	 truth she found. 

(V, i, 11) 

This implies that the justice to be dispensed by Artegall is 
likely to be a very rough and ready sort, as indeed it is. 
Yet the action of Book V aims at bringing this admittedly partial 
ideal as close as possible, within the fallen world, to the 
purity of its former state. This requires, as we shall see, 
its constant control and mitigation by empirical factors -~ 
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and especially by the human impulse to compassion exemplified 
in Books III and IV. In this respect, Artegall is a mixture 
of Redcross and Guyon, as Justice is a combination of single­
minded insistence on truth and the practical sense of what 
is appropriate under changing conditions. 
Artegall's encounter with the egalitarian Giant in 
Canto II makes clear that a just judgement cannot, however, 
be a matter of mere expediency. The Giant's simplistic notions 
of bare mathematical equality seem at first to resemble the 
concept'of the mean as exemplified by Guyon. The Giant intends 
to restore to the world the aboriginal equali'ty that obtained 
between land and sea, nature and man, noble and peasant. But 
as Artegall points out, to do this a person must first know 
what those original proportions were. Moreover, justice is 
not s imply a ratio, the dead ari thmeti c mean between two 
extremes. No amount of falsehood or injustice is commensurate 
with "truth ll and IIright ll Justice is always in the middle, • 
and cannot be weighed with equal parts of injustice. Artegall1s 
insistence that the scales cannot deal with intangibles suggests 
that the Giant's essential error is materialism, the belief 
that numbers are adequate to describe all that exists. (Thus 
even at this early date we find socialism and materialism hand 
in hand.) The point ;s that there is no ratio, no simple formula 
f'or determining justl~ce, since it is a dynamic concept a1ways 
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changed by circumstances. The lIdoom of right" depends not upon 
calculation but upon insight. There is, of course, the kind 
of justice which requires an eye for an eye and a tooth for 
a tooth -- simple retributive justice. But how can one determine 
a punishment that fits the crime -- one, that is, that does 
an injury to the perpetrator of a crime equal to the injury 
inflicted by him? Here it is the intangibles that determine, 
and for this reason no simple counter-balancing of wrongs will 
suffi ce. 
In the mind the doome of 	right must bee. 

(V, ii, 47) 

Artegall has already demonstrated this in his 
judgement of the dispute between Sir Sanglier and the young 
squire .. Simple arithmetic equality -- the dividing of the lady 
into two equal parts -- is no solution at all. Justice in this 
case depends upon insight into character; Artegall perceives 
by Sir Sanglier's easy acquiescence where the truth lies. 
The arbitration of the dispute between the two brothers, 
Amidas and Bracidas, develops this point more fully. Like the 
Giant, each brother bases his claim upon the original status 
of his inh~ritance, before the ever-shifting sea had transferred 
each onels wealth to the other. Artegall poj~ts out that the 
ideal of justice is not static but Qynamic, like the sea itself. 
Amid ever-changing circumstances, one principle obtains, name1y 
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that justice is one for all parties to the dispute. The 
principle that awards the land to Amid~s is the same principle 
that awards the treasure to Bracidas. 
So was their d;scord by this doome appeased,
And each one had his right. 
(V, iv, 21) 
This is the principle of distributive justice, which means 
that a judgement is just only if the same principle is applied 
in the same way to every party in a given case. Since circumstances 
alter cases, the principle appealed to will differ from one 
instance to another. Thus the concept of distributive justice 
cannot be implemented by any simple rule of thumb. Justice 
is a complex inerp1ay of permanence and change, the One and 
the Many (a principle invoked later at the trial of Mutability). 
It is dynamic, not static; it depends upon insight, not 
calculation; and it requires both the singleness of vision 
exemplified by Redcross and the practical sense of the mean 
illustrated by Guyon. In justice as in ethics, as Aristotle 
reminds us, "it is the mark of the educated man to look for 
precision in each class of things just so far as the nature 
of the subject admits." 1 
Whoever dispenses justice must be prepared to back 
his judgements with force, Spenser reminds us at the beginning 
of Canto IV. 
Whoso upon himselfe will take the skill 
True Justice unto people to divide, 
1 Ni comachean Ethi cs, I, iii. 
79 
Had neede have mightie hands for to fulfill 

That which he doth with righteous dOOITe decide, 

And for to maister wrong and puissant pride; 

For va;ne it ;s to deeme of things aright, 

And makes wrongdoers justice to deride, 

Unless it be perform'd with dreadless might; 

For power is the right hand of Justice truely hight. 

(V, iv, 1) 
One symbol of Artegall's "dreadless might ll is the iron man, 
Talus, who is incapable of pity and against whom no antagonist 
can prevai1. But there is, as we might expect, something 
subhuman and mechanical about Talus; he executes Artegal1 's 
judgements with a brutal literalism, and must repeatedly be 
restrained by Artegall and later by Br;tomart. He is, one might 
say, that side of Artegall's character defined by the motto 
Salvagesse sans finesse. Yet the merely instrumental nature 
of Talus' power ;s demonstrated when Artegall, having foolishly 
agreed to Rad;gund's conditions of battle, is subdued by her 
beauty and becomes a thrall to the "monstrous regiment ll of 
women. Talus does not interfere because he .is bound by Artegall's 
judgement and has no power to act on his own initiative. 
Yet all that while he would not once assay
To reskew his own Lorde, but thought it just t l obay. 
(V, v 19) 
The instrumental nature of this aspect of Artegall 's 
power is also emphasized in Canto VIII, where Artegall mistakenly 
does battle with Arthur. When Samient explains who his opponent 
is, Artegall apologizes, saying 
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Sir Knight, of pardon I you pray,

That a1l unweeting have you wrong'd thus sore, 

Suffering my hand against my heart to stray. 

(V, vi i, 13) 
This implies that the power that Artegall disposes must always 
be subordinate to the heart and mind that direct it. In one 
sense, the egalitarian Giant's mistake was to assume that mere 
mindless measurement, the application of rules of thumb, could 
produce a just judgement. But 
In the mind the doome of right must be. 
(V, ii, 47) 
Artegall's subjection to Radigund develops another 
side of his nature -- his susceptibility to feminine beauty 
and to misplaced compassion. Radigund herself points out that 
in this case Artegall has been the cause of his own bondage. 
Not my valour, but his own brave mind, 
Subjected hath to my unequal m; ght. 
(V, v, 32) 
A comparison between Artegall here and Guyon in the Bower of 
Bl i S5 ; 5 instruct; ve. Guyon is touched by the temptati on to 
forget his quest in the presence of feminine beauty, but he 
ruthlessly presses on to the destruction of the Bower. Artegall 
is i nfl uenced not by 1ust but by somethi ng more 1i ke compass i on; 
nevertheless, he reveals himself here as less single-minded 
than Guyon. At the same time, the motif of the wound of Adonis 
is repeated once more in Artega 11 IS fi ght wi th Radi gund. 
And, like a greedie Beare unto her pray, 

With her sharpe Cemitare at him she flew, 
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That glauncing down his thigh the purple blood forth drew. 
(V, v, 9) 
Thus Spenser reminds us that the virtue of Justice in some 
sense contains and depends upon the virtues celebrated in ear1ier 
books. Artegall's task is somehow to reconcile in his prosecution 
of evi1doers the single-minded vision of Redcross, the temperance 
and se1 f-control of Guyon, and the super; ority to passi on 
which is yet compassionate -- symbolized by Britomart. 
The di ffi culty of thi s task is stressed by the fact 
that there is no single figure in Book V who is the exemplar 
of Justice in its fulness. (Astraea, we recall, has long since 
fled from the scene.) Artegall restrains Talus, but needs he1p 
from Britomart. The vision of the unity of masculine and feminine 
qua1ities ;s not embodied in an actua1 being but in a dream 
centred upon an idol -- Britomart's "won drous vision" in Isis 
Church. The very strangeness and barbar; ty of the dream, in 
which the crocodile devours the flames and tempest and then 
enters into a sexual union with the goddess, suggests the 
complexity of the idea that Spenser is trying to develop_ 
Britomart's vision is at two removes from reality, so to speak, 
and is interpreted by the priests as a prophecy of the eventual 
union of Artegall and Britomart. This leaves the impression 
that Spenser found the concept of Justice peculiarly intractable 
to his efforts at symbolic unification. He has, of course, 
already warned us of the decay in the antique ideal of Justice. 
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There is thus a sense of growing complexity in the structure 
and tone of the poem, a complexity which takes us at once further 
away from the ideal unity of Book I and closer to the ambivalences 
and ambiguities of the world as we know it. This progression 
in complexity is to continue in Book VI, where Colin'svision 
of the Graces on Mount Acidale is destroyed by the arrival 
of Calidore -- an event which suggests a contradiction between 
the active life of the courtier and the contemplative life 
of the poet. 
Britomart's victory over Radigund supplies a further 
perspective on the nature of Justice. It not on1y repeats the 
Renaissance and Aristotelian notion that rule by women is 
monstrous and unjust but also makes the point that Justice 
is not something to be negotiated between sovereign and citizen. 
Britomart curtly refuses to listen to Radigund's "conditions" 
before the battle .. This stresses once again the abso.lute nature 
of Justice, the fact that Justice cannot be a respecter of 
persons, or deal differently with one wrongdoer than with others. 
At the same time, Britomart restrains Talus once more from 
his pitiless prosecution of lesser figures. 
All these issues and motifs are recapitulated in 
the trial of Duessa in the House of Mercilla. Spenser revea1s 
a certain uneasiness at the camp1lexity of his concept of Justice 
by raising explicitly the question of whether Mercy can be united 
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wi th Jus t i ce . 
Some Clarkes do doubt in their devicefull art 

Whether this heavenly thing whereof I treat, 

To weeten Mercie, be of Justice part, 

Or drawne forth from her by divine extreate: 

This well I wote, that sure she is as great,

And meriteth to have as high a place, 

Sith in th ' Almighties everlasting seat 

She first was bred, and borne of heavenly race, 

From thence pour'd down on men by influence of grace. 

For if that Vertue be of so great might 

Which from just verdict will for".nothing start, 

But to preserve inviolated right

Oft spilles the principal to save the part; 

Of such more, then, is that of powre and ski1l, 

That seekes to save the subject of her skill, 

Yet never doth from doome of right depart,

As it is greater prayse to save then spill,

And better to reforme then to cut off the ill. 

(V, x, 1-2) 
Significantly, he says that Mercy llmeriteth to have as high 
a place" as, and that it deserves "greater prayse ll than,the 
merely just verdict, but he cannot bring himself to identify 
the two. This issue of· course has already been treated, though 
in a much different perspective, in the redemption of Redcross 
in Book I. There it was a question of bringing Redcross to 
see that God's wrath and His charity are one. Obviously, 
however, this is possible only in the metaphysical perspective 
of Holiness. As the poem develops, we move further and further 
away from Redcross' transcendental vision, until in Book V 
the two great virtues are no longer identifiable as one. 
Merci l1a seeks to It save the subject of her ski 11", but in the 





Duessa, she must ultimately order her execution, and content 
herse 1 f wi th 
ruing her wi1ful fall 
With more then needfull natural remorse, 
And yeelding the last honour to her wretched corse. 
(V, x, 4) 
The domi nant impress ion 1 eft by Book V, then, is 
of a rigorous attempt on Spenser1s part to explicate the 
ideal of Justice in a way that respects both its absoluteness 
and the need to temper its decrees with compassion. Spenser 
takes considerable care to insist upon both aspects, lest the 
concept degenerate into the two opposite extremes of fanaticism 
on the one hand and mere cynical expediency on the other. Thus 
the impersonal literalism of Talus is balanced by the compasslon 
displayed by Britomart. Yet "in the fight against Radigund it 
is Artegall who is overcome by compassion, and Britomart who 
upholds the absolute nature of the ideal by refusing all 
negotiation. Artegall insists, as against the simplistic 
literalism of the Giant with his scales, that truth and right 
are ever one, yet he is guilty of compromise with Radigund. 
The just judgement, Spenser seems to be saying, is always one 
and yet never the same, a dynamic and complex principle that 
is exemplified in the world only partially, yet remains one 
within itself, like the Platonic forms of which it is one of 
the most important. 
The potnt is the Platonic one that no virtue can 
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exist apart from wisdom. Simplistic notions too often lead 
to the corrupt; on of Justi ce into fanati cislll or expediency. 
Only he who combines the constant devotion to truth exemplified 
by Redcross, and the practical temperance of Guyon can undertake 
to judge in such weighty matters, and even so, Justice in the 
world as we know it is of all virtues the most difficult and 
perhaps the most rare. C. S. Lewis I adverse comments on Book 
V of The Faerie Queene are a form of ad hominem argument based 
on Spenser IS View of the Present State of Ireland. IIIn all 
this," says Lewis, 
there is somethi ng I sha11 not a ttempt to excuse. 
Spenser was the instrument of a detestable policy 
in Ireland, and in his fifth book the wickedness 2 
he had shared begins to corrupt his imagination. 
This judgement seems to the present writer to be not wholly 
fai r to Spenser I s poem. What emerges from the study of Book 
V is the sense that Spenser has confronted an extremely 
difficult concept with great integrity, trying to preserve 
and to harmonize two almost totally opposed values. It is 
fatally easy to forget the idea of Justice in the complexities 
of human experience, and, as many radicals do, to abandon it 
altogether in favour of a simplistic ideal of "peace" and 
"love ll This is to ignore, however, the kind of realism that• 
tempers all of Spenser's ideals -- the honesty that leads him 
to include unpalatable truths in his poem as well as visionary 
2 c. S. Lew; s, The All egory of Love, London, Oxford 
University Press, 1938, p. 349. 
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ideals. If, as seems to have happened in Book V, this requires 
apparent inconsistencies, so much the better. As his poem 
develops, Spenser1s vision of the world develops with it; it 
becomes more ironic and complex, until the simplicities of 
Books I and II -- admirable and true though they are in their 
own context prove no longer adequate in a world that is 
becoming more and more recognizable as the fallen world of 
our present experience. To insist upon primal simplicities 
in a fallen world is just the mistake of the egalitarian 
Giant, and those who make the same mistake today are granted 
the same reward -- the admi rat; on of Jlfoo1es, women " and boys II 
(v, ; i, 30). 
The object of the Renaissance poet was, above all, 
to produce in the reader the ability to govern. As Spenser 
himself says, his IIgeneral end" was lito fashion a gentleman 
or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline." 3 Sir 
Philip Sidney expressed the same thought by saying that poetry 
works "not onely to make a Cyrus, which had been a particular 
excellence, as Nature might have done, but to bestow a Cyrus 
upon the world, to make many Cyrus 'S.11 4 Such an aim requi res 
3 
"Letter to Raleigh", .QQ.. cit., p. 1. 
4 An Apologie for Poetrie, edited by J. Churton Collins, 
Oxford, the Clarendon Press, 1907, p. 9. 
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that the problem of justice, the question of "law and order ll as 
it is called, be faced. It was not open to Spenser lt as it is 
to modern poets, to dismiss the problems of the ruler as 
inherently wicked. Indeed, quite the reverse. According to 
Sidney, all branches of learning, but most particularly poetry, 
are 
directed to the highest end of the mistress 
knowledge, by the Greekes called architectonike, 
which stands (as I thinke) in the knowledge of 
a mans selfe, in the Ethicke and politicK 
consideration, with the end of gell dooing
and not of well knowing onely. 
This makes it unmistakably clear that the object of private 
and personal virtue is public and political virtue, that the 
ethical process culminates in the political process. 
This perspective enables us to see in the structure 
of the fi rst fi ve books of the poem an aim and a direction 
that knits them all into a purposive whole. In a sense, his 
explications of IIHoliness" and "Temperance ll and IIChastity" 
are the necessary preparation for his explications of 
"Friendship", "Justice li , and IICourtesyll. As his perspective 
shifts from private to public virtues, from pathos to ethos, 
the poem becomes more and more complex. This progression 
permits a discussion of Justice that avoids both the Scylla 
of fanaticism and the Charybdis of mere expediency or 




opportunism. As we have seen, he requires at this stage not 
a single exemplar of this virtue, as had been the case with 
the private virtues, but a community of figures, each of 
whom at various times contributes to the development of the 
concept. Yet we are sustained amid these complexities by the 
memory of the achievements of Redcross, Guyon, and Britornart, 
who participate in the action as reminders that Justice is 
the unified functioning of these prior virtues in the 
complexity of the public arena. 
CHAPTER SIX 
The Fading Vision 
In several respects Book VI is the most complex, 
and the most deeply ironic, book of The Faerie Queene. Its 
complexity is not that of symbolism or of structure as in 
Book III, but of tone and attitude. Calidore, unlike any of 
his predecessors, forgets his quest for a time, and comes 
close to abandoning it altogether, attracted by his love for 
Pastorella and the simplicities of life with Meliboee and 
Coridon. The presence of the poet's alternate persona, Colin 
Clout, supplies a second perspective on the action -- a 
perspective which at times even seems to run counter to the 
accepted values of Gloriana's court. The battles of Book 
VI appear to be deliberately inconclusive; few of them are 
to the death, and even the Blatant Beast eventually escapes 
from Calidore and remains at the end as destructive and malign 
as ever. 
In an acute and detailed study of Book VI,l Richard 
Neuse argues that this irony is the product of Spenser's deepening 
1 "Book VI as Conclusion to The Faerie Queene"!l English 





despair of seeing his courtly ideal realized. lilt reflects," 
he says, lithe poet's desire to find solace in a pastoral idyll 
from the harshness of the historical world." 2 It is the values 
of privacy and contemplation that are chiefly threatened by 
the thousand tongues of the Blatant Beast. Colin's vision of 
the Graces on Mount Acidale fades at the approach of Calidore 
because Colin represents a private and reflective attitude 
toward 1ife that cannot survive in the corrupt world of 
pragmatic values which the champion of Gloriana has come to 
represent. 
Mr. Neuse's analysis of the tone of Book VI is a 
clear and cogent one. Many of his conclusions seem justified 
by the many baffling ironies that develop. The present study 
differs from the view of Mr. Neuse, however, in the assumption 
that this result is not conditioned historically by Spenser1s 
disappointment with the life of the court, but is the logical 
development of the themati c structure of the poem and has been 
implicit in it from the outset. 
As we have seen, Book III is set over against Books 
and II by the fact that it depicts a movement arising from 
the depths of nature to meet the supernatural or purely human 
virtues of Holiness and Temperance. Similarly, Book VI is set 
2 Loc. cit., p. 222. 
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over against Books IV and V by its greater insistence on 
the simplicity of the natural life as contrasted with the 
civic virtues of amity and justice. Courtesy, Spenser informs 
us, is lithe root of civil conversation" (VI, i, 1). This 
vegetative -imagery is sustained throughout the introductory 
stanzas. Courtesy itself was "by the Gods with paine/ Planted 
in earth, being derived at furst! From heavenly seedes of 
bounty soveraine" (VI, Proem). Courtesy, "though it on a 
lonely stalke does bowre/ Yet brancheth forth in brave 
nobilitee ll (4). Calidore is the knight in whom II gentleness 
of s,pright/ And manners mylde were planted naturall ll (VI, 
i, 2). This virtue, the poet insists, is a quality that is 
more often inherent in a man's nature than attained by labour 
and discipline. 
Thereto great helpe dame Natures selfe doth lend; 
For some so goodly gracious are by kind, 
That every action doth them much commend, 
And in the eyes of men great liking fynd, 
Which others that have greater skill in mind, 
Though they enforce themselves, cannot attaine. 
(V r, ii, 2) 
Sir Tristram, who becomes Calidore·s squire, is so pleased 
at the honour that he blossoms before our eyes 
Like as a flowre, whose silken leaves small 
Long shut up in the bud from heavens view, 
At length breakes forth, and brode displays his smiling hew. 
(V I, ii, 35) 
Even the rape of Pastorella by the brigands has correspondences 
with the Persephone myth, for when Calidore frees her from 
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underground prison her rescue is like a restoration of life. 
So her uneath at last he did revive, 
That long had lyen dead~ and made again alive. 
(VI, ix, 50) 
Book VI is remarkable also for the frankness and 
openness of its sexual activities. Priscilla and Aladine, 
Calepine and Serena, Claribel1 and Bellamour, even Calidore 
and Pastorella celebrate their loves naturally, frankly, and 
openly, in a manner reminiscent of the lovers ;n the Garden 
of Adonis. Here the obstacle to their joy is not moral scruple 
but rather the damage that will be done to the women's 
reputations by the Blatant Beast ~- whose wounds, in any case, 
are much more easily cured than the wounds of love in Book III. 
The dominant image of such naturalness is, of course, 
the pastoral setting of much of the book. The life of Meliboee 
is the symbol of a life lived close to nature, far from the 
envy and detraction that prevail at court, and therefore not 
vulnerable to the attacks of the Blatant Beast. Thus the natural 
world celebrated ;n Book VI differs from the "nature ll depicted 
"in Book III ;·n that it is interpenetrated by the human. It has 
something of the frankness and honesty of the Garden of Adonis 
translated into human nature, this time without the intensity 
and moralistic restraint so typical of Redcross, Guyon, and 
Britomart. The rigour of the quest is here relaxed, and, 
though the poet cannot approve Calidore 1 s evasion of 
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responsibility, he cannot bring himself to condemn it either. 
Ne certes mote he greatly blamed be 

From so high step to stoupe so low, 

For who had tasted once (as oft did he)

The happy peace which there doth overflow, 

And prov'd the perfect pleasure which do grow

Amongst poor hyndes, in hils, in woods, in dales, 

Would never more delight in painted show 

Of such false blisse, as there is set for stales 

T' entrap unwary fooles in their eternal bales. 

(VI, x, 3) 
The confl i cts of Book VI 1ack the deadly seriousness 
of the battles in earlier books. Crudor and Briana are not 
deep-dyed villains but basically good-natured people who have 
acquired rough and brutal ways, and they are taught courtesy 
by Calidore, not exterminated as they would have been by 
Artegall. (Thus Calidore represents a softening of the rigour 
exemplified by Artegall, and is able to achieve, as Artegal1 
and Mercilla could not, the rehabilitation of the criminal. 
As it is greater prayse to save then spill,
And better to reforme then to cut off the ill. 
(V, x, 2) ) 
Turpine is merely IIbaffuld ll , not slain. Arthur spares the 
giant Disdain at the request of Mirabella, and even the 
Blatant Beast is merely bound for a time. Indeed, Calidore ' s 
pursuit itself often seems more like flight; he follows it 
from courts to cities and from there to the country and the 
farms, but when he comes to the open fi e1ds, where the 
shepherds have no knowledge of the Beast, he stays there. 
This suggests that he is more concerned with escaping from 
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the Beas tIs defamati on himse 1f than wi th ri ddi ng the comrnonwea1 th 
of it -- perhaps because the latter ;s impossible in any case. 
In the characters of Tristram, lithe salvage man", 
and Pastorella Spenser develops the theme of the contrast 
between "nature II and "nurture H • All three are apparentl y of 
noble blood -- Tristram a prince and Pastorel1a the 10st 
daughter of Bellamour and Claribell. They -- and, indeed, 
Calidore himself, whose courtesy seems innate and not learned 
are examples of "natural" good breeding which reveals itself 
in spite of their lack of education and the humble circles 
in which they move. Thus Book VI contrasts strongly with 
earlier books, in which virtue is to be gained only at the 
cost of great labour and painful experience. The description 
of the Graces, dancing to Colin's pipe on Mount Acidale, 
accentuates this motif of natural gifts. "These three,1I says 
Colin, 
on men all gracious gifts bestow, 
Which decke the body or adorne the mind, 
To make them lovely or well-favoured show; 
As comely carriage, entertainement kynde,
Sweet semblaunt, friendly offices that bynde, 
And all the complements of curtesie. 
(VI, x, 23) 
They are naked because they are "without guile or false 
di ssemb1aunce II (VI, x, 24); they represent a goodness deep 
within nature that stands over against the hyprocrisy and 
fraud connoted by the term "courtier" in its pejorative or 
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Machiavellian sense. They appear to Colin because Colin is 
Spenser1s alter~, the symbol of the poet devoted to his 
own private vision which cannot survive the translation into 
IIpublic matter of fact. II This explains, perhaps, why Spenser 
apologizes to Gloriana for celebrating the beauty of his own 
IIcountry 1ass ll ; he feels the contradiction between his private 
poetic vision and the devotion of his art to the Il ethicke 
and politick consideration". 3 For the vision, once past, 
cannot be recalled at will. 
For being gone, none can them bring in place, 

But whom they of themselves list so to grace. 

(VI, x, 20) 

It represents a region of the mind which is neither pathos 
nor ethos, an experience which is not IIsufferingll in the 
ordinary sense but which falls' outside the rational order 
because it seems to be vouchsafed from "above ll rather than 
from IIbe 1owl! . 
Thus both Calidore and the poet seem to combine 
within themselves two contradictory sets of values, the public 
and the private. The poem, which has been movi~g steadi1y from 
the intensely private virtues of holiness and self-control 
towards the more pub1ic virtues of friendship and justice, 
seems here to cir,c;le back on itself. The developing irony, 
3 An ~olog;e fo,!:. Poetrie, edited by J. Churton C01lins, 
Oxford .. the Clarendon Press, 1907, p. 13. 
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however, is not the result of Spenser's disillusionment with 
the original ideas and ideals of the poem; it ;s a consequence 
of the poem's structure, which reveals a pattern of progressive 
"displacement ll or ambiguity as it proceeds .. One might say that 
each book brings us closer to the world of actual experience~ 
where the single-minded vision of Redcross and the moral rigour 
of Guyon and Britomart -- though entirely proper within their 
own contexts -- are apt to seem fanatic and inhuman. We have 
seen this pattern emerge in Book V, where the incompatibility 
between civil order and IIgrace li appears in Artegall's and 
Mercilla's failure to unite justice and mercy. There, however, 
the possibility of their ult"imate union was insisted on through 
the prophecy of the eventual marri age of Artega11 and Bri toma rt. 
Book VI is more deeply ironic in that there is no provision 
for such a reconciliation between the private world of 
contemp1ation and the growing "democratic ll values which are 
an assault upon natural personal nobility. As a result, the 
poem takes on qualities which have come to be thought of as 
distinctively modern -- a disinclination. to espouse any single 
moral point of view, a sense of the relativity of values, and 
a resulting ironic reserve on the part of the poet, a reluctance 
to identify any single attitude as correct or sufficient in 
itself. There is thus, in Spenser's ideal of courtesy, an 
element of what moderns call savoir faire. But as a result, 
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the poet himself seems to suffer a form of schizophrenia; he 
returns to the pastoral idiom which he had ostentatiously 
abjured in the Proem to Book I. 
La! I, the man whose Muse whylome did maske, 

As time her taught, in lowly Shephards weeds, 

Am now enforst, a far unfitter taske, 

For trumpets sterne to change mine oaten reeds. 

Nevertheless, if Calidore falls short of 
exemplifying the moral rigour and the unshakable purpose of 
Redcross and Guyon, Britomart and Artegall, he does exemplify 
a more liberal and in some ways more humane attitude towards 
life. His virtue is natural and innate, not learned, as was 
that of Redcross and Artegall. He and his associates in the 
quest are better able to reform and rehabilitate their adversaries. 
In a sense, Calidore, who comes close to forgetting his mission, 
is the counterpart of Talus, who, once embarked on a task, 
pursues it with the mechanical tenacity of an automaton. He 
is thus more humane and more recognizably human than his 
predecessors. He is in many ways the complement and counterpart, 
especially, of Artegall. Book VI is more complex than earlier 
books because it deals with a side of human nature often sadly 
lacking in the heroic character -- tolerance. 
Of course, Calidore is still a representative of 
the court, and his presence is plainly antithetical to whatever 
it is that Colin's vision on Mount Acidale represents. 
Nevertheless, the mere fact that he is privileged to watch it 
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at all suggests that he is more capable of understanding its 
value than some of Gloriana's other champions. (We can imagine 
the di staste and di sapprova1 wi th whi ch Redcross or Guyon 
would have responded to the sight of 
An hundred naked maidens lillv white 

All raunged in a ring and dancing with delight.

(VI, x, 11) ) 

But Mount Acidale is not the Bower of Bliss, nor even the 
Garden of Adonis. It is, perhaps, the human counterpart of 
the Garden, where the nakedness of woman represents a free 
and uncorrupted response to beauty of every kind. Calidore 
is enchanted by it, but he also admits that his allegiance 
to the symbol of civil order precludes him from such visions 
of private felicity. 
Now sure it yrketh me, 
That to thy b 1 i sse I made thi s 1 uckl esse breach, 
As now the author of thy bale to be, 
Thus to bereave thy loves dear sight from thee: 
But, gentle shepheard, pardon thou my shame, 
Who rashly sought that which I mote not see. (VI, x, 29) 
Thus, as Spenser's poem moves further and further 
away from the private values of intellect, reason, and chastity 
towards the public values of amity, justice, and courtesy, 
the ironic gap between individual felicity and public order 
is more and more accentuated, until in Book VI it seems that 
this development must be compensated for by the insertion of 
Colin's private vision, which, though very different morally, 
is a secular version of Redcross ' vision on the Hill of 
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Contemplation. A full study of the complex structure of the 
poem as a whole will be undertaken in a later chapter. 4 Here 
let it suffice to say that Book VI is not the symptom of 
Spenser's growing despair at the inadequacy of his courtly 
ideal, but is the necessary sequel to it, in which its original 
intensity is modified by an awareness of human existence in 
its enti rety . 
In a study of the Cantos of Mutability) Harry Berger 
advances the view that in Spenser1s poetry as a whole there is 
an overall developmental pattern in which three 
vectors coalesce: from lower to higher, from 
simpler to more complex, and, of course, from 
earlier to later. 5 
But the equation: later = more complex = higher (which, as 
Berger says, is an evolutionary pattern) is misleading if not 
balanced by an awareness of its opposite, which might be 
called the "entropic lt pattern. This valuation, which is 
exemplified in both the Eden myth and the second law of 
thermodynami cs, vi ews change necessari ly as decay; its equati on 
is: later = more chaotic = lower. And it is apparent that these 
two patterns may be discerned in the universe and in human 
life as coexisting. Spenser's poem too displays them together; 
from one point of view, his later heroes, because they live 
4 See Chapter Seven of this study, pp. 101-114. 
5 liThe Mutabilitie Cantos: Archaism and Evolution in 
Retrospect,1I in Spenser: flCollection of Critical Essays, 
Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968, p. 146. 
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in a world more recognizably contemporary with us, are more 
mature and realistic. From another, because they have lost 
sight of the archetypal unity that was present to Redcross, 
they represent a decline from the intensity of earlier ideals. 
Spenser's poem thus moves in both directions at once. Each 
book is a self-contained "un iverse of discourse ll which works 
out the implications of a single moral value. Yet together 
they constitute a set of perspectives which complement (and 
sometimes confli ct with) one another. Thus the plan of the 
poem as a whole ;s designed progessively to illuminate the 
entire ethical process, to reconcile innocence and experience, 
and thus to form a complex symbol of the full range of human 
moral activity. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Theme and Structure ;n Books I to VI 
Spenser is the most systematically rhetorical of 
any major English poet. His characteristic method is to 
establish a broad conceptual scheme (for example, the cycle 
of the months in The Shepherd's Calendar or Mutabilitie, the 
Seven Deadly Sins, the "twelve moral virtues as Aristotle hath 
devised") and methodically to exploit it. This requires that 
he pay speci'al attention to the principle of decorum, which, 
as Milton remarked, is "'the grand masterpiece to observe. II 1 
The detatled writi'ng must be carefully suited to the governing 
concept, tn action, character, setting, and imagery. Within 
thts pattern, Spenser brings into play all the resources of 
his rhetorical skill, embroidering his poem with conventional 
devices like the epic simile, the lyrical IIcomplaint", the 
heraldic challenge, and the aphorism which expresses traditional 
wisdom. 
From one point of view, this leaves him open to the 
accusation that his poetry is too methodical, systematic almost 
to the point of being mechanical. It has great advantages too, 
IJohn Milton, "0f Education", in The Portable Milton, 





however. For it permits a fullness and richness of treatment, 
which ensures an objectivity that is not to be found in the 
work of less pedestrian poets. The allegorical scheme of The 
Faerie Queene produces a series of self-contained structures, 
each celebrating a particu1ar moral virtue; yet the sequence 
of books adds complementary perspectives. As a consequence ~ 
Spenser's meaning is not to be found through minute scrutiny 
of the verbal texture in the fashion of the II new critics", 
It is comprehensive and cumulative. It emerges only after each 
book has been considered as a necessary adjunct to the entire 
structure .. This makes it impossible to state the theme of the 
poem in any simple prose formulation; the theme and structure 
are indistinguishable. 
Broadly speaking, the six completed books of The 
Faerie Queene follow a sequence that passes from the individual 
to the collective, the private to the public aspects of ethical 
behaviour. Books I to III are focussed upon processes that 
occur essentially within the individual soul ~- religious 
justification (Redcross), rational self-control (Guyon), and 
erotic fulfilment (Britomart). Books IV to VI are primarily 
concerned with social and political relationships between 
individuals -- friendship, justice, courtesy. In this aspect 
of the poem's structure, obviously, Books III and IV are 
critical because together they form the hinge on which the 
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whole structure turns, and accomplish the transition from the 
"pri vate II to the "publ i e". To strengthen the structure here, 
Spenser has welded them together by virtue of the fact that 
the action straddles these two books; the stories of Marinell 
and Florimell, Scudamour and Amoret, Artegall and Britomart 
are begun in Book III but not completed until Book IV. This 
structural device suggests the closeness of the relation 
between the thematic elements. Love is the most "social 11 of 
private experiences and friendship the most private of social 
experiences. The actual progress of thematic development may 
be shown by the contrast between Book I and Book VI. The action 
of Book I is apocalyptic in its intensity, and the conflict 
is essentially between Redcross l intellect and the illusions 
of Archi mago, who is a surrogate for Satan, lithe great dragon [I • 
Redcross' most difficult moment is occasioned by the "still, 
small voice ll of Despair, with its whispered incitement to 
suicide. By contrast, the action of Book VI is more diffuse 
and secular. Calidore 1s adversary is less clearly defined 
and harder to fight, while at the same time less deadly than 
Redcross'. Calidore is preoccupied by questions of social 
well-being, not religious atonement. The adventures of Guyon, 
Scudamour, Britomart, and Artegall are carefully graduated 
in theme between these two extremes, Guyon's quest being 
more IIpub1; c" than Redcross I, in the sense that it depi cts 
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a plurality of impulses within the soul which must be brought 
into unison by reason, and more private than Britomart's or 
Scudamour's because it is confined to the arena of the 
individual psyche. A similar progression may be observed in 
succeeding books. 
This sequence from unity to multiplicity, privacy 
to publicity, displays aspects of evolutionary growth as we1l 
as of what we have call ed "entropi c de cay II • As the act; on 
and the dominant characters become more social, they also 
become more worldly and more ambivalent. Scudamour, Artegall, 
and Calidore are more recognizable as human beings, with 
faults and shortcomings, than are Redcross, Guyon, and 
Britomart. At the same time, their adversaries are 1ess 
archetypal, more realistic. The ambiguity of this structure 
is emphasized by the poet's continuing references to the decay 
of the chivalric ideal, the impossibility of justice and 
courtesy in the actual world. This IJdisplacement ll , to use 
Freud's term, is ambiguous in the sense that it is a 
progression both away from a primitive state of innocence 
and towards a more tru1y human maturi ty. As Harry Berger poi nts 
out, 
the normal and normative growth of human 
consciousness and conscience ;s from a relatively 
narrow, simplisti c, or elementally Jlpure"
perspective to a broader, more complex, and 
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comprehensi ve perspective. In early or regressive

stages, for example, distinguishable areas tend 

to blur or overlap, as when the mind fails to 

perceive or respect" the boundaries between itself 

and the world, man and God, self and other, love 

and hate, heaven and earth ...• 2 

This statement illustrates the perspective of "evolutionary 
growth "; according to this scheme, Redcross l vision of the 
identity between God and man must be designated as "narrow II , 
"simplistic", and IIregressive". But it is certainly not 
presented purely as such in the poem, for Spenser continually 
rewa i 1 s the corrupti on of anti que va 1ues ina way whi ch 
suggests that he also saw sl1ch "growth" as decay .. In this 
respect, it is Artegall and Calidore who represent the narrow 
and the simplistic. (Spenser's ambivalent attitude towards 
this process is most clearly expressed in the Mutabilitie 
Cantos, and the discussion of this problem will be continued 
in Chapter VIII of this study.) 
We have seen that Books I to VI of The Faerie Queene 
display a binary or two-part structure depicting a consistent 
progression of theme. But they may also be analyzed to reveal 
a ternary or three-part structure. In this perspective, the 
completed books may be arranged in three sets of two. Books 
I and II are associated by virtue of their concentration upon 
the cognitive values of intellect and reason (in Kantian terms, 
2 Harry Berger, Jr., liThe Mutabilitie Can~os: Arch~i:m 
and Evolution in Retrospect," in Spenser: A Collectlon of Cntlcal 
Essays, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice~Hall, Inc., 1968, p.-r46. 
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"reason" and "judgement ll , respectively). Redcross ; s the 
exemplar of contemplative vision, Guyon of rational self­
control. Books III and IV are closely related not only by 
their unity of action but by their concern with the "affective" 
values of erotic impulse and social concord. Books V and VI 
are similar in that each is concerned with the political or 
social relationships of the community at large. In each of 
these pairs, the later book is related to the earlier by the 
fact that its "virtue" is less intense and more accommodating. 
Just as Guyon's "judgement" is a softened and more circumspect 
form of Redcross I lI·intell ect ll , so Cal i dore t s "courtesyll is 
a more flexible and humane way of dea1ing with people than 
is Artegall's "justice l1 Obviously a similar relation obtains• 
between IIfriendship'J and IIchastity". This gradual decline in 
intensity (alternatively, it is a development in humaneness) 
is another aspect of the "displacement" referred to above .. 
But there is a third aspect of the structure of 
the poem that co-exists with the first two -- yet another 
bi nary structure refl ecting a rhythm; c repeti ti on of moti fs 
in which Books I, III, and V are contrasted with Books II, 
IV, and VI by the aspect of displacement already described. 
Thus Redcross, Britomart, and Artegall are the exemplars of 
a single-minded tenacity as opposed to the more accommodating 
and congen; al characters of Guyon, Scudamour, and Cal i dare. 
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This complexity of structure exemplifies the advantage gained 
by Spenser's systematic rhetorical technique, for each 
successive book modifies and complements the theme of its 
predecessor; Guyon supplies an element of cognitive behaviour 
which Redcross lacks, and so throughout. Thus, while each 
individual book is conceptually self-contained, their sequence 
gradually fills out and builds up a view of human ethical 
behaviour that is remarkable in its breadth of vision, its 
objectivity, and its freedom from rigidity and fanaticism. 
As C. S. Lewis remarks, 

Spenser's whole method is such that we have a 

very dim perception of his characters until 

we meet them or their archetypes at the great 

allegorical centres of each book. 3 
Exactly the same may be said of the poem as a whole. If the 
"allegorical centre" of each book is its thematic core, so 
a 1 so is the sequence of such "allegor; cal centres" the tl1emati c 
core of the entire poem. Considering them in sequence, we come 
upon yet another variation in Spenser's rhythmic structure. 
As a binary pattern, the House of Holiness, the Castle of Alma, 
and the Garden of Adonis are balanced by the Temple of Venus, 
Isis Church, and Mount Acidale. As Northrop Frye remarks, we 
have a double sequence of two "houses of recognition" followed 
by a locus amoenus (the Garden of Adonis, Mount Acidale).4 
3 The All egory of Love, London, Oxford Uni versi ty 

Press, 1938" p. 336. 

4 liThe Structure and Imagery of'The Faerie Queene,1I 
in Fables of Identity: Studies in Poetic~tho10gy, Harcourt 
Brace, NewYork, 1963, p. 77 . Unaccountably, Frye substi tutes 
the Palace of Mercilla for Isis Church. 
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This suggests a sequence in the poem from a level above nature, 
through the purely human, to the level of nature (part of the 
same pattern of displacement alluded to earlier). Within this 
broad pattern, however t there are contrasts that articulate 
the meaning ever more clearly. Redcross ' vision of Truth in 
the House of Holiness is paralleled by Scudamour's vision of 
the androgynous figure representing the union of male and 
female in the Temple of Venus. Britomart's dream in Isis 
Church dramatizes the same concern for concord in society 
as Guyon's experience in the Castle of Alma does for concord 
in the soul. Mount Acidale is a humanized and IIdisplaced" 
repetition of the infra-human beauty of the Garden of Adonis. 
We are thus permitted to observe the steady and systematic 
un fo 1d-j n9 of a comprehensi ve vi s i on of the re1at; ons between 
God and man, man and woman, and man and nature. 
In such a subtle and massive complex of meanings, 
it is obviously foolhardy to insist upon any simple, linear 
interpretation. Spenser's own example warns us that no single 
value, no single perspective, can encompass all values and 
all meanings. His poem thus has the range and the mystery, 
the clarity and the complexity of life itself. Yet as the 
narrative basis for all this there remains the one recurring 
situation in which a chivalric champion sets out, in response 
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to the complaint of a "postulant", to bring an evildoer to 
justice. In each book the unfolding pattern of narrative and 
imagery is triggered by the imp1ied lIoathll or Ilcompact" (to 
use the terms of the Tracta tus Co; s 1 i ni anus) entered ; nto by 
the hero by virtue of his membership in Gloriana's service. 
The external action in each case is converted by the allegory 
into both a public and a private struggle. Redcross, to free 
Una's parents, must first attain to sanctification himself. 
Conversely, Britomart, in order to recover herself from the 
wound of love, must rescue Amoret from the tyrannical 
dominion of lust syrrbolized by the House of Busirane. Each 
champion must, in one way or another, come to terms with 
injustice, either in the soul or in society, and this struggle 
in turn provokes and requires an exploration of the relations 
between God and man, man and himself, man and man, and man 
and nature. An essential part of this exploration ;s the 
confrontation with falsehood and illusion -- with Archimago. 
Duessa, Phantastes, Maleger, the snowy Florimell and the Bower 
of Bliss, the flames that guard the House· of Busirane, the 
egalitarian Giant and the false social regimen of Radigund, 
the defamation and psychic poisonings of the Blatant Beast. 
This, once more in the terms of the Tractatus Coislinianus, 
is the proof (or disproof) of pis tis (opinion) as the 
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preliminary to the establishment of gnosis (true knowledge) .. 
In terms of the Roman juridical process f it ;s the probatio 
that issues in assured knowledge and the consequent certainty 
of just judgement. 
Yet, paradoxically, this repeated quest seems to 
generate a progressive complexity by means of its own dialectic. 
As each adventure culminates in the death or defeat of the 
antagoni st it provokes a countermovement whi ch supp1; es a 
different perspective on the "justice" thus achieved. Having 
attained to the vision of holiness on the Hill of Contemplation, 
Redcross is required to turn back from the promised union with 
God in order once more to enter the fallen world in which Una's 
parents remain to be set free. Like Milton, Spenser cannot 
accept a merely "cloistered virtue". This return to the 
complexities of the fallen world creates the need to combine 
the other-worldly values of faith with a more practical and 
empirical ability to control one's own human impulses -- the 
"temperance ll of which Guyon is the exemplar. Guyon, in turn, 
is the most puritanical and ascetic of champions. His overthrow 
of Acrasia provokes its own countermovement, the exploration 
of the opposite side of human nature -- the erotic impulse 
as depicted in Books III and IV. Similarly, the harshness 
and intransigence of Artegall's nature is tempered not only 
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by his union with Britomart but by his complementary figure, 
Ca1 i dore, whose IIcourtesy" represents the fi nesse -- the more 
gentle, human qualities that are Hplanted natural U in him -­
which Artegall lacks. Each champion contributes opposite but 
complementary qual ities to the developing image of ethical 
behaviour. 
This progression is a function of what we have 
called Spenser's objectivity. For the just judgement must be 
a reflexive one; it must take into account its own biases 
and shortcomings. This often means that the solution of one 
problem will generate a new set of problems. It is this 
dialectical pattern that is apparent in the sequence of 
virtues of the poem. In each adventure, triumph is but 
momentary -- a truth stressed in the action of each narrative 
by the fact that each new adventure is both a new task and 
a repetition of the one just completed in a different perspective. 
But this progression leads to a stead; ly increasing tone of 
i roni c scepti cism, unti 1 by Book VI 'vIe se'em to reach another 
critical point in the total structure. Calidore forgets his 
quest for a time, and even when he achieves it the results 
are ambiguous and inconclusive. 
The view of the structure of the poem presented 
here is thus different from that of Mr. Neuse,5 who sees in 
5 Richard Neuse, IIBook VI as Conclusion to The Faerie 
Queene", English Literary History, Vol. 35, No.3 (September t 
1968). 
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this developing irony a symptom of the poet's growing 
disillusionment with the courtly ideal. It differs also, in 
some respects, from Frye's assumption that lithe six books 
form a unified epic structure. 1I 6 They are, of course, a unity, 
as our analysis of their binary and ternary structures indicates. 
But the unity is a dynamic unity, which sets up a dialectical 
sequence in which each book solves one problem only to create 
another. This pattern is especially marked at moments of 
lIinterface" between adventures. Guyon encounters Redcross 
at the beginning of Book II, and the Palmer's words make clear 
that Guyon's adventure is a continuation of the same task in 
a different context. 
Joy may you have, and everlasting fame, 

Of late most hard atchiev'ment by you donne, 

For which enrolled is your glorious name 

In heavenly Registers above the Sunne, 

Where you a Saint with Saints your seat have wonne. 

But wretched we, where ye have left your marke, 

Must now anew begin like race to ronne. 
(II, i, 32) 
At the meeting between Artegall and Calidore at the 
beginning of Book VI, Calidore experiences a similar moment 
of anxiety .. 
"Now, happy man," (sayd then Sir Calidore)

IIWhich have, so goodly as ye can devize, 

Atchiev'd so hard a quest, as few before; 

That shall you most renowmed make forevermore. 

"But where ye ended have, now I begin, 

To tread an endless trace. • 
.11 (VI, i, 5-6) 
6 liThe Structure and Imagery of The Faeri e Queene ll 
~. cit., p. 70. 
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Calidore's sense that his adventure is not merely a new 
beginning but part of an lI endless tracel! of new beginnings 
marks the distance travelled between Book II and Book VI, 
and is part of our deepening awareness that_the historical 
process never reaches its term, that no success is complete 
and final, and that each achievement merely leaves us our 
work to do allover again. 
This is the paradox of time and change which is 
a constant theme of The Faerie Queene. As Whitehead said, 
the culmination of each growth cycle is both a return to, 
and a decline from, unity. 
'Creativity" ... is that ultimate principle by 
which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, 
become the one actual occasion, which is the 
universe conjunctively. It lies in the nature of 
things that the many enter into complex unity .... 
The ultimate metaphysical principle is the advance 
from disjunction to conjunction, creating a novel 
entity other than the entities given in disjunction. 
The novel entity is at once the togetherness of the 
'many' which it finds, and also it is one among the 
disjunctive I many • which it leaves ... The many
become one, and are increased by one. 7 
The massive irony of the total structure of The Faerie Queene 
is that each achieved resolution, each moment of poetic 
harmony and individual and social "justice" is but momentary, 
and each attempt to supplement it merely creates new data 
7 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An 
Essay in. Cosmology, London~ MacMillan, 1929, p. 33. 
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to be harmonized, in an endless progression. 
By the end of Book VI, therefore, the developing 
structure of the poem seems to have reached an impasse; the 
poem is in danger of dissolving altogether into the chaos 
of human history. Yet the dialectic which has created this 
crisis also contains its counteragent. If, as the letter to 
Raleigh suggests, Spenser's intent was to complete the poem 
in twelve books, then we have reached the major crisis of the 
structure, and we could expect that the completion of the 
pattern would call for the initiation of a countermovement 
which would lead away from the ironic dissociations of Book 
VI and back towards the assured possession of truth celebrated 
in Book I. And, of course, we have the beginning of such a 
countermovement in the Mutabilitie Cantos, which, IIboth for 
forme and matter, appeare to be parcell of some following 
Booke . under the Legend of Constancie_ JI 8 It is to 
Spenser's confrontation of constancy with mutabi1ity that 
we must look for indications of his plan for the continuation 
of the poem. 
8 The Faerie Queene, Everyman Edition, Dent,1955, 
p. 426. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
The Tribunal of Nature 
As has been said, the very richness of Spenser1s 
structure in The Faerie Queene, and his concern for 
objectivity and adequacy of statement, create a movement 
within the poem that disturbs the security and assurance 
expressed in early books and leads to a crisis in Book VI 
in which the courtly ideal itself ;s called into question. 
Thus there is a sense in which both the subject and the 
structure of the poem are centred on the fact of mutability, 
Change in its various forms has been a principal antagonist 
of his champions throughout. As the fact of human mortality, 
expressed in the cyni ca.1 and defea ti st speech of Despair, 
it had precipitated the crisis in Redcrossl spiritual 
development. For, as Despair says, is it not the sentence 
of a just God that all shall die? As the power of the emotions 
to di'srupt human purpose, the deadly contradi cti on between 
immoderate joy and immoderate despair, between Amavia and 




As the corruption of desire and the tendency to animality within 
the human psyche, it forms the basis of the struggle of Britornart 
and Scudamour. Artegall encountered it in the Protean shapes 
adopted by Malengin, and in the argument of the egalitarian 
Giant, who proposed to disrupt the natural order on the basis 
of a doctrinaire belief in an aboriginal equity. Calidore meets 
it in the loss of his own sense of purpose, and in the deadly' 
enmity between natural nobility and the envy and detraction 
symbolized by the Blatant Beast, who suffers no achievement 
to survive. Spenser punctuates his poem with nostalgic odes 
to the beauty and harmony of the antique world .. Thus the 
outburst of anxiety over the domination of lithe ever-whirling 
wheele of Change ll at the beginning of the Cantos of Mutabilitie 
is the continuation and culmination of a recurring theme -­
the instability of human existence, intellectual, ethical, 
and political, which in turn derives from the radical 
instability at the heart of nature. 
It is significant that the issue is raised now in 
the form of a trial, for, as we have seen, the appeal of a 
postulant for justice against an evil-doer is the single most 
basic narrative method employed in the poem. But unlike the 
appeals of Una, the Palmer, Scudamour, and Irena, all of 
which eventually result in the vindication of the claimant 
117 

aga-inst the usurper, the claim of Mutability that Jove ;s an 
usurper is ult-imately denied .. This suggests that IIBook VIlli, 
if indeed the Cantos of Mutability form part of the next 
succeeding book, was to represent a radical change in the 
direction of the poem .. And, in a total structure of twelve 
books, it is obvious that something of the sort would have 
to take place. The assumption of this study is that the 
Cantos of Mutability are the allegorical centre of what was 
intended as the crisis of the entire poem. 
Mutability's claim to sovereignty in earth and in 
the heavens results in a formal juridical process among the 
gods, complete with postulatio, appeals to a higher court, 
summonses to the members of the tribunal, interrogatio of 
witnesses, and the delivery of a final judgement (probatio) 
by Dame Nature herself. The trial exemplifies at the same 
time the movement from pistis to gnosis that we have observed 
in each of the preceding quests. The peripeteia, or reversal 
in the di recti on of the case, is dramati c and sudden. As the 
evidence of Mutability's power over earth and heaven, gods 
and men, steadily mounts, it appears that her case must of 
necessity be granted. But, as Dame Nature points out, all her 
evidence is two-edged because all the examples cited are 
cyclical. Thus what had seemed to be proof that every existing 
thing is subject to mutability is in fact proof of the opposite, 
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for the spectacle of steady and ordered succession is in fact 
the reverse of mere decay. Moreover, Mutability's claim is 
self-defeating; she is revealed now as herself orderly and 
constant in a way she had not realized, and so has in fact 
been arguing for her own dissolution. 
More than this, the process of change is revealed 
to be itself cyclical. Though 
all things stedfastness do hate 
And changed be; yet, being rightly wayd, 
They are not changed from their first estate; 
But by their change their being do dilate, 
And turning to themselves at length again, 
Do worke their own perfection so by fate. 
(Mutabilitie, vii, 58) 
As critics have remarked, there appears in this notion of 
things IIturning to themselves .•. again" to be a reference 
to the Platonic doctrine of lithe great year. II Time, as 
Plato says, is but the moving image of eternity, and though 
we can measure the smaller cycles of day, month, and year, 
we cannot measure the much larger cycles of the heavenly 
bodies. 
And yet there is no difficulty in seeing that the 
perfect number of time fulfills the perfect year 
when all the eight revolutions, having their relative 
degrees of swiftness, are accomplished together and 
attain their completion at the same time, measured 
by the rotation of the same and equally moving.
After this manner, and for these reasons, came into 
being such of the stars as in their heavenly
progress received reversals of motion, to the end 
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that the created heaven might be as like as 

possible to the perfect and intelligible 

animal, by imitation of its eternal nature. 1 

Thus at the climax of the trial the concepts of 
justice and "constancyll are juxtaposed, if not identified. 
Justice, that is, is shown to be possible by the fact of 
orderly change in nature, society, and man; and the change 
is orderly because it is not merely chaotic and linear 
di spl acement but purposive Ilemanation II and return. Thi s 
concept unites the two processes of evolutionary growth and 
entrop; c IJdecayll; one is necessary to the other. The orderly 
abandonment of, and return to, the original state makes 
possible the Ildilation of beingll which is another word for 
growth. 
In Plato1s conception, since there was never a 
moment when the universe began, there shall never be a moment 
when it ceases. Thus, for him, the IIGreat Yearll begins and 
ends at every moment. This explains why the moments ~f beginning 
and end in any cycle are causes for rejoicing or anxiety, or 
both -- midnight, Sunday (the Sabbath, Spenser 1 s "SabaothlJ)~ 
New Year's Eve. It also explains the outbursts of anxiety that 
occur in Spenser's poem at the beginning of each new book. 
F or the end of a cycle is the moment when time completes i tse1 f 
1 Plato, The Timaeus, translated by Benjamin Jowett, 
in The CollectedDiaTOguesof'Plato, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1963, p.1168. 
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as an image of eternity and points beyond itself to the realm 
where no such change exists. But, since it ;s also the beginning 
of a new cycle, it makes us aware of the endless repetition 
which is the demonic image.of~time. The Palmer's words to 
Redcross at the beginning of Book II, and Calidore's to 
Artegall at the beginning of Book VI are examples of such 
ambivalent moments. The claim of Mutability to absolute power 
over Nature is the apotheosis of such moments of anxiety, 
occurring at what would, in a completed structure of twelve 
books, be the critical point of transition -- the seventh 
canto of the seventh book. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the two 
cantos of Book VII. brief though they are, contain incidents 
which are reminiscent of crucial moments in earlier books. 
Jove, about sUTIlnarily to condemn Mutability for her impertinence, 
stays his hand because of "her lovely face ll (vi, 31), just 
as Artegall IS salvagesse had been softened by Radigund's beauty, 
Nature, like Venus in Book III, is veiled, and is said to 
combine two natures. In the initial debate, Jove's very right 
to dispense justice ;s questioned by Mutability on the grounds 
that he was born on earth and is therefore subject to her. 
Just so had Redcross been challenged by Despair, and with the 
same effect. Mutability answers Jove's claim that the gods 





Spenser is speaking from experience -- are all that is to 
be found there now. 
The trial of Mutability therefore repeats and 
summarizes the developing theme and selected motifs from the 
rest of the poem, as a preparation for the defini tive statement 
of the counter-idea. Nature's judgement upon Mutability's claim 
is based on the fact that all the examp1es of change which 
she herself has cited are orderly and cyclica1 .. 
I we11 consider all that ye have said, 

And find that a11 things stedfastness do hate, 

And changed be; yet being rightly wayd,

They are not changed from their first estate, 

But by their change their being do dilate, 

And turning to themselves at length againe, 

Do work their owne perfection so by fate. 

(vii, 58) 
The crucial idea is that change is not decay but a IIdilation 
of being", in which what appears to be lost is not lost 
permanently, but remains to be regained at the completion of 
the cycle, and the accumulation of lIeccentricities ll is subsumed 
finally into the regained aboriginal state. The prose formulation 
of this doctrine is to be found in Whitehead's Process and 
Rea 1i ty. 
What is done in the world is transformed into 

a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven 

passes back into the wor1d. By reason of this 

reciprocal relation, the love in the world 

passes into the love in heaven, and floods back 





perishing occasions in the life of each 
temporal Creature, the inward source of 
di state or of refreshment, the judge ari si ng 
out of the very nature of things, redeemer 
or goddess of mischief,-rs the transformation 
of itself, everlasting in the Being of God. 
In this way, the insistent craving is justified __ 
the insistent craving that zest for existence 
~e refreshed by the ever-present, unfadi ng
lmportance of our immediate actions, which 
perish and yet live for evermore. 2 
The link between these two attempts to describe 
the relation between growth and decay, evolution and 
entropy, is to be found in Plato's concept of Time as a 
result of the very plenitude of Eternity. Eternity without 
Time is incomplete, as Redcross' intellect is incomplete 
without Guyon's judgement, or Artegall's justice without 
Calidore's courtesy, Even more obviously, Time without 
Eternity is incomplete. Each concept is in need of the other. 
In the same way, the quest for justice in the poem is not to 
be attained apart from the attainment of moral virtue, which 
as Plato says is the state of justice in the soul. Significantly, 
Whitehead too links together the act of judgement with the 
concept of everlastingness; lithe judge arising out of the very 
nature of thi ngs . . . is the transformati on ·of (creatures), 
everlasting in the Being of God. 1I 
Some such conclusion is necessary to the structure 
2 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An 
Essay .iD.. Cosmology, London, MacMill~n, 1929, pp. 532-3. The 
italics are those of the presentwrlter. 
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of the poem, for without it the dialectic of the first six 
books must inevitably result in the ultimate erosion of all 
values in absolute scepticism. With it, Spenser provides the 
double perspective that enables him both to affirm val ues and 
to realize that no single value is sufficient in and of itself. 
The virtue of constancy, which was to be celebrated in this 
book, is parallel to the virtues celebrated in Books I, III, 
and V -- Holiness, Chastity, and Justice -- in that it insists 
upon the final unity and orderliness of all meaning. Books 
II, IV, and VI, on the other hand, supply the complementary 
vision of multiplicity and variety (for which Mutability 
makes such a large claim) which is necessary in order that 
there may be, as Whitehead says, II zes t for exi'stence.1l We 
might expect that, had the poem been continued, Book VIII 
would have celebrated a value complementary to that of 
Constancy in order to maintain the same rhythm. 
The trial of Mutability is remarkable also because 
it takes p1ace not within the mind, as in the case of Redcross 
and Guyon, nor within human society, as in the case of Duessa 
in Book V, but within Nature itself. This corresponds with 
the movement already observed from privacy to publicity, from 
subjectivity to objectivity. The next most "objective" level 
would be a tribunal beyond even nature -- the Last Judgement 
itself. Nevertheless, the juqgement delivered against Mutability 
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repeats and ratifies the achievements of Redcross, Guyon, 
Britomart, Artegall, and Calidore. It supplies the basis for 
their own constancy. Obviously, in a world ruled by mere 
featurel ess change, II a new worl d every day, II as Santayana says, 
"with the same fool to live in it, II 3 any judgement must become 
fa 1 se the moment it is uttered .. The certai nty that there is 
a "nature of things", a constant character or essence, ensures 
that human Judgements can be va 1 i d. 
Thus the powerful statement of the fact of Constancy 
in a world apparently ruled by change is the metaphysical 
ground of all the other treatments of virtue in the poem. In 
even more abstract form~ this is the perennial philosophic 
problem of the One and the Many, which we have seen in the 
background of each earlier quest. Redcross' search for unity 
with God is the most direct treatment of the theme, but it 
underlies all the other actions as well. Guyon's task of 
reducing the multiplicity of human impulses to orderly unison 
is the same problem in psychological terms. The unity achieved 
by Britomart is sexual and social, and the action of Books 
III and IV aims at the unity of male and female symbolized 
by the androgynous Venus, as well as the civic unity symbolized 
by Troynovaunt .. The prob 1em of Justi ce per ~ is the un; on 
of Mercy and Justice, or the preservation of the absolute nature 
3 See above, pp. 37-8. 
of justice in a fallen world where injustice appears in 
Protean and inexhaustible variants. The problem of Courtesy 
is that of decorum, of bearing oneself in a seemly and 
appropriate manner towards all men, whatever their degree, 
and thus achieving a justice of relationship that is at once 
constant and yet almost infintely variable. 
For whether they be placed high above 

Or low beneath, yet ought they well to know 

Their good; that none them rightly may reprove 

Of rudeness for not yeelding what they owe. 

(VI, ii, 1) 
The Faerie Queene itself ;s a richly patterned 
examp1e of the poeti c sol uti on to the problem of "uni ty in 
multeity and multeity in unity!! (to use Coleridge's term),4 
for in spite of its length it is controlled by the single 
concept of that unity of nature, society, and the individual 
which is justice. Each book is, from one point of view, a 
self-contained "universe of discourse", a cyclical action 
which departs from and then returns to a state of equilibrium. 
As a sequence of books, the poem displays a similar pattern, 
for as it moves from private to public value it displays a 
developing complexity and irony that appear, superficially, 
to exemplify a form of entropic decay. Yet in the Cantos of 
4Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 
edited by J. Shawcross, Oxford, the Clarendon Press, 1909, 
Vol. I I) p. 230. 
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Mutab i 1i ty thi s process is arrested by a re-affi rmati on that 
even this growth in complexity is not the decay of the original 
concept but a IIdilation of its being" which, we can assume, 
would have been continued in the last six books as a movement 
back towards the metaphysical unity of Book I. Thus each book 
of the poem in relation to its total structure is an exemplar 
of unity within multiplicity, and as such provides Spenser 
with a poetic mechanism unrivalled in its richness and its 
adequacy of statement. 
Another term we have used for "adequacy of statement ll 
is "object; vi ty". Spenser I s poem is objecti ve, not in the 
scientific sense, which implies the exclusion of subjectivity, 
but in the poetic sense which implies intelligent awareness 
of that very subjectivity. As a rich symbol of the mind in 
contact wi th real i ty, The Faeri e Queene is the uni on of the 
One and the Many which is the essence of human consciousness. 
What Ernst Cassirer said of the mind is an exact characterization 
of Spenser1s poem: 
Here there is not from the very s ta rt an abstract 
lone I confronted by an eq ua lly abs tract and detached 
lather'; here the one is linl the many and the many 
is linl the one: in the sense that each determines 
and represents the other. 5 
5 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Form, 
translated by Ralph Manheim, Yale University Press, New Haven, 
Va1. 1, p. 108. 
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